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The politics of booms and busts: fiscal policy over the business and electoral 




How do countries, through their political institutions, adapt fiscal policy to economic and 
political shocks? The goal of this dissertation is to explain variation in the response of public 
spending and the fiscal balance to the business and electoral cycle across a large sample of 
countries. I develop a theory that builds on the political agency problem to argue that a 
government’s ability to run prudent spending decisions over the business and electoral cycle is 
conditional on the structure of public finance (e.g. where does revenue come from?). 
Government revenue stems from two main sources: general taxation, and fiscal windfalls derived 
from natural resource wealth such as oil royalties, or grants from foreign aid. The key 
assumption of the theory is that each of these two revenue sources affects the amount of 
information that voters have about the true state of public finance, and thus the degree of 
uncertainty about the extent of rent extraction by incumbents. When governments rely on fiscal 
windfalls to finance most of their expenditures, voters have incentives to behave as fiscal liberals 
and demand higher public spending in the face of a positive economic shock. The reason is that 
while taxes are perfectly observed by voters, windfalls that accrue directly to government coffers 
are not, limiting voter ability to keep rent seeking politicians under control. Thus, fiscal policy is 
driven by voter’s demands. I offer cross-national and subnational empirical evidence that is 
consistent with this theory: fiscal policy is more procyclical, political budget cycles prevalent, 
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The global economic crisis of 2008-2009 revived interest in the stabilization function of fiscal 
policy in both academic and policy circles. While some countries (including developing nations) 
used available fiscal space to support active countercyclical measures, such as selective tax cuts 
and increases in social transfers to vulnerable groups, others (including some industrial 
countries) were obliged to set fiscal adjustment measures such as public spending cuts and the 
reduction of primary deficits, limiting the capacity of fiscal policy to provide stimulus and 
mitigate the collapse of domestic demand. What explains such diversity in policy behavior? In 
other words, why is fiscal policy procyclical (e.g. government spending increases in good times 
and falls in bad times) in some countries but not in others? This question is not only of policy 
interest, but has also important theoretical connotations, as it relates to classic debates in 
comparative political economy about why are some countries able to adapt or adjust public 
policy to changing economic conditions while others fail to do so.1 
 Traditional (e.g. economic based) explanations usually emphasize the role of credit 
constraints in shaping the behavior of fiscal policy over the business cycle. The argument goes 
that developing countries find it hard to follow countercyclical policy measures because they 
lack access to international credit during recessions, suggesting that any explanation of 
                                                
1 In addition to the issue of procyclicality, the question about the differential capacity of countries to adjust policy 
has been asked in a variety of policy contexts such as macroeconomic stabilization (Alesina and Drazen 1991), 
structural reforms in developing (Rodrik 1996) or transition countries (Frye 2010), and welfare state retrenchment in 





procyclical behavior needs to take into account the issue of credit constraints or limited 
creditworthiness during downturns. However, the problem with this economic explanation is its 
inability to provide answers to the following questions: why can't countries self-insure by 
accumulating fiscal resources in good times? Why would lenders not provide funds to countries 
if they were convinced that borrowing would help smooth out the cycle in the first place? Similar 
problems pervade arguments that link procyclical policy with volatility (Talvi and Vegh 2005) or 
patterns of integration in the world economy (Wibbels 2006). If anything, these variables may 
actually point in the opposite direction of a procyclical bias: the more volatile and exposed an 
economy to international trade, the higher the incentives for politicians to behave in a 
countercyclical way, by creating fiscal instruments such as stabilization funds, cyclically 
adjusted balance based fiscal rules, or allocating higher shares of automatic stabilizers (e.g. 
unemployment insurance) in the budget. After all, this is exactly how some small and open 
economies adapted their fiscal policy to changing economic conditions, leading to a robust 
positive relationship between trade openness and government size during the post World War II 
era (Cameron 1978; Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 1998).   
The difficulties of an approach solely based on crisis episodes or volatility are coupled 
with one of the key lessons learned from the recent Great Recession: only countries that pursued 
more prudent fiscal policies during the pre-crisis period were then able to implement more 
aggressive and consistent countercyclical policies during the downturn (IMF 2009). This 
suggests that in order to explain why fiscal policy is more procyclical in some contexts more 
than others a shift in focus is needed: in particular, one needs to look at the behavior of fiscal 





Several political economy theories study the determinants of fiscal behavior during good 
times, providing important insights on what features of political institutions and economic 
structure make procyclical biases more likely to occur.2 Yet, with few exceptions (Alesina et al. 
2008), most of these accounts tend to neglect the role of voters in shaping fiscal policy outcomes. 
This omission by the literature is particularly problematic when considering the basic fact that in 
democracies, expenditure decisions can affect the politician's likelihood of remaining in power, 
and if such consequences can be anticipated, one would expect politician's to modify their fiscal 
behavior accordingly. 
 
The argument  
 This dissertation brings voters back into the picture and building on a principal-agent 
framework of public finance, tries to explain variation in the response of fiscal policy to 
economic (business cycle) and political (elections) shocks across a large sample of countries. 
The basic argument is that government’s ability to run prudent spending decisions over the 
business cycle is conditional on the nature of the budget constraint, or structure of public finance 
(e.g. where does revenue come from?). Government revenue stems from two main sources: taxes 
(on goods and services, corporations, individuals, etc.) and non-tax revenues or fiscal windfalls 
derived from natural resource wealth such as oil, grants from foreign aid, or intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers for a subnational government, in the context of fiscal federal arrangements.3  
                                                
2 See Tornell and Lane (1999), Talvi and Vegh (2005), Ilzetzki (2009), Woo (2009) among others. 
  
3 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term fiscal windfall as a shorthand for any type of revenue that does not 
require the collection of private income from citizens.  More formally, revenue windfalls are defined by their 
disproportionate revenue-to-cost ratio compared to the standard production of goods and services in the economy 






In general, tax and windfall revenue tend to be substitute revenue basis, in the sense that 
economies that for example are more resource intense have weak ex-ante incentives to invest in 
fiscal capacity, understood as the state’s ability to extract tax revenue from the public in general, 
and from broad tax bases such as income and consumption in particular (Besley and Persson 
2011). Figure 1 provides initial information about this basic tradeoff in a sample of 107 countries 
observed between 1990 and 2007: the overall tax take tends to be relatively low in the presence 
of fiscal windfalls (measured here as the share of fuel exports in total exports).4  












Recent studies provide more robust cross-country empirical (panel) evidence on the 
negative impact of access to natural resource revenue on domestic tax effort (Bornhorst et al. 
2009, Jensen 2011; Perry and Bustos 2011). In addition, similar relationships have been shown 
                                                
4 In addition to overall tax levels, the negative relationship between taxes and windfalls is observed when looking at 
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for the case of foreign aid, such as grants (Gupta et al. 2003; Knack 2008), and in the context of 
(fiscal) decentralization, there is evidence that some types of intergovernmental transfers tend to 
promote low levels of fiscal effort by making regional or local level governments neglect own 
sources of revenue generation, thus falling prey to problems of fiscal laziness (Desai et al. 2003; 
Perry and Olivera 2009; Artana et al. 2012). Both foreign aid and intergovernmental transfers 
share a number of similarities with natural resource fiscal revenues, to be explained below. 
Given the distinction between taxes and fiscal windfalls, the key assumption of the theory 
is that each of these two revenue sources affects the amount of information that voters have 
about the true state of public finance, and thus the degree of uncertainty about the extent of rent 
extraction by incumbents. Specifically, the theory assumes that voters have more information 
about the taxes they pay than the amount of windfall revenue that governments receive. Why? 
First of all, consider the revenue collection technology: fiscal windfalls accrue directly to 
government coffers, without any need of private collection from citizens. Secondly, consider the 
incentives for incumbents to be transparent about the exact size of the windfall. To the extent 
that windfalls increase total budget size, if opacity marks the budget process, then this provides 
leverage for incumbents to please imperfectly informed voters with public goods, which are 
useful for reelection purposes, while at the same time grabbing residual rents for themselves.  
Thus, when governments fund a significant share of their spending with fiscal windfalls, 
citizens have less information about the total revenue base, and opportunities for rent seeking 
politicians to capture public funds increase. In the face of a positive economic shock (e.g. such as 
a commodity boom), the voters’ optimal response is then to demand higher levels of public 





public spending: voters demand public goods in good times and incumbent politicians supply in 
order to stay in power.  
Thus, the micro-foundations of why fiscal policy is procyclical in some countries and not 
others depend in part, on the informational context in which voters find themselves. If taxes 
make up a large share of the total public budget, voters are more informed about the availability 
of fiscal resources in government coffers, reducing the opportunities for rent-seeking on behalf 
of politicians. Conversely, if windfalls represent the lion’s share of public monies, voters are 
more uncertain about how much is up for grabs, and in order to tie the hands of incumbent 
politicians, demand higher levels of public goods. The flipside is that under some conditions, this 
induces policy to be procyclical.    
 
Empirical implications  
 
Several empirical implications follow from this argument. First, we should find that other 
things being equal, countries that fund most of their government expenditures with fiscal 
windfalls run more procyclical fiscal policy than countries that rely on domestic taxation. 
Secondly, the presence of fiscal windfalls should provide both a motive and an opportunity for 
incumbents to engage in opportunistic political budget cycles, that is, changes in fiscal policy 
during election years induced by incumbents desire for re-election. Finally, it is also possible to 
test the informational assumption: that is, the proposition that voters should be less informed 
about public budgets in countries that are more dependent on fiscal windfalls.  In the context of 
fiscal policy, this issue can be approached through the lens of the determinants of fiscal 





we should observe more opaque budget procedures in countries where the structure of public 
finance makes windfall revenue the key component.  
To test these two hypotheses and the informational assumption empirically, I rely on a 
broad time-series cross-sectional dataset including fiscal information for more than one hundred 
countries in a period expanding over forty years. In addition to these cross-national empirical 
exercises, I test the informational assumption with subnational level data by looking at the 
impact of the last oil boom on the local public finance of Brazil’s more than 5000 municipalities. 
Together, the combination of cross-national and subnational tests provides empirical support for 
the propositions derived from the theory. To motivate the puzzle, argument and empirical 
evidence, I start by considering the varied fiscal response of two middle income democracies in 
Latin America to exogenous endowment shocks: Chile and Venezuela.    
 
Motivation: evidence from Latin America 
Latin America has been usually considered a fiscal basket case. Episodes of fiscal 
profligacy during good times, in which deficits were covered by printing money – resulting in 
high inflation, and in extreme cases, hyperinflation – or by tapping financial markets, leading to 
exploding debt ratios, often ending in debt crises, were usually followed by the tightening of 
fiscal policy during “sudden stop” episodes (e.g. large falls in capital inflows and skyrocketing 
interest rate spreads).5 For example, Mexico and Argentina suffered deep recessions in 1995 as a 
result of the Tequila crisis. At the same time, both countries engaged in sharp fiscal adjustments, 
including cuts in targeted spending for the poor (Wodon et al. 2000). More systematic evidence 
of procyclical fiscal policy in a broader sample of Latin American countries during the 1980s 
                                                





and 90s is present in the pioneering papers of Gavin et al. (1996) and Gavin and Perotti (1997) at 
the Inter-American Development Bank. 
 Against this historical background, the last decade witnessed significant change in the 
fiscal policies of several countries in the region: average deficits declined steadily and debt ratios 
have improved (Vladkova-Hollar and Zettelmeyer 2008; IMF 2009; Daude et al. 2010), and in 
contrast to previous crisis episodes, several countries were able to implement effective 
countercyclical fiscal policy. While there is some debate in the literature about whether these 
changes were the result of structural or temporary factors6, and recent studies caution about the 
potential problems induced by a tendency for not withdrawing the stimulus measures adopted 
during the last crisis (Powell 2012), there is no doubt that the shift during the 2000s has resulted 
in considerable heterogeneity in the conduct of fiscal policy across different countries (Clements 
et al. 2007; Villafuerte et al. 2010). One of the most striking contrasts is offered by the 
comparison of fiscal policy behavior in two commodity-exporting countries of the region: Chile 
and Venezuela, where copper and oil are important drivers of the economy, respectively. 
 As commodity exporters, both countries face a set of similar fiscal challenges stemming 
from the close connection between fiscal revenues and the volatility and unpredictable evolution 
of resource prices.7 Yet, while public spending tracks closely the behavior of oil prices in 
Venezuela, in Chile the opposite phenomenon occurs with the price of copper.8 More recently, 
the evidence shows that during the last commodity boom period (2003-2008), fiscal policy was 
                                                
6 See Izquierdo and Talvi (2008) and Vladkova-Hollar and Zettelmeyer (2008). 
 
7 For a discussion of the particular set of challenges that commodity abundance poses to public finance management, 
see Engel and Valdes (2000), chapters in Davis, Ossowski and Fedelino (2003), and Devlin and Lewin (2005). 
 
8 The correlation between real public expenditures and oil (copper) prices in Venezuela (Chile) is positive (nega- 






highly procyclical in Venezuela, and mostly acyclical in Chile (Izquierdo and Talvi 2008; IMF 
2009; Villafuerte et al. 2010).   
 As result of these developments, policy reactions to the 2009 crisis differed significantly. 
While output contracted by more than 1.5%, fiscal policy was decisively countercyclical in 
Chile: real government spending increased by 11%, driven in part by a targeted transfer program 
to poor households. In contrast, total government expenditures decreased by 7% in real terms in 
Venezuela, in the wake of an output contraction twice as large as that of Chile (World Economic 
Outlook, Sept. 2011). Another way to capture variation in discretional policy behavior is by 
looking at the evolution of the structural fiscal balance and corresponding measure of fiscal 
impulse, that can be interpreted as the year-to-year change in discretionary fiscal policy once the 
effect of cyclical output and commodity price fluctuations have been removed (IMF 2009), as 
shown in Figure 2. 
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As shown by the Figure, while both countries suffered negative changes in output gaps during 
2009 (shaded region), the fiscal impulse (FI) in Chile was positive (indicating expansionary or 
countercyclical fiscal policy), whereas in Venezuela it was negative (indicating contractionary or 
procyclical fiscal policy). 9 
To explain this variation in policy behavior scholars have commonly focused on the role 
of good economic institutions, such as the existence of natural resource stabilization funds 
(NRFs) or fiscal rules based on structural balances, as solutions to restrict political discretion and 
foster prudent fiscal policy (Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel 2008; Medina 2010; Frenkel 2011). 
The problem with this explanation is that both Venezuela and Chile count with similar formal 
mechanisms of stabilization and were even put into practice by incumbents with similar 
ideological orientations and background. However, while in Chile the NRF works adequately, in 
Venezuela it does not. In fact, against all economic rationale, in Venezuela the so-called 
stabilization fund accumulates reserves (in the form of contributions) when international oil 
prices are low, rather than high! In contrast, the NRF in Chile performs its countercyclical 
function since its foundation in the late eighties. Thus, one needs to look beyond institutional 
arrangements to understand the incentives of politicians to save fiscal resources under different 
economic scenarios. 
 In particular, an often-overlooked difference between these countries that this dissertation 
brings to the forefront is the revenue base, or structure of public finance. While both of these 
democracies are considered resource rich in the Latin American context, levels of fiscal resource 
dependence vary significantly between them, and more generally, across the region (Jimenez and 
Tromben 2006). In Venezuela, between 1992 and 2010, around 50% of total government 
                                                
9 The structural or cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) is the government’s actual fiscal position after controlling for 
the budgetary consequences of the business cycle and other exogenous factors such as commodity price movements 





revenues originated from oil related sources on average. In Chile, while copper’s share of fiscal 
revenues has increased significantly during the last commodity boom, this figure has remained at 
around 10% during the same period (Ossowski and Gonzales 2011). 
As a result of such diverse fiscal foundations, I argue that differences in the amount of 
information available to voters about public budgets, or variation in levels of fiscal transparency, 
should be likely to emerge between these countries. In a budget survey of more than ninety 
countries developed by the Open Budget Society in 2010 and that will be studied in more detail 
later on, Chile’s fiscal transparency score ranked in the top ten percentile of the distribution (with 
a score comparable to those found in OECD countries), while Venezuela had a score well below 
the mean for the Latin America region and world sample. I argue that given the informational 
constraints that Venezuelan voters face about the availability and use of public revenues by 
incumbents, it is rational for them to demand public goods in the face of a positive economic 
shock, and incumbent politicians will have incentives to engage in political budget cycles in 
order to remain in power. Such procyclical demands on behalf of voters and thus, the incentive 
for incumbents to manipulate the budget around election times, should be less intense in the 
Chilean context where fiscal windfalls represent a lower share of the total budget. 
 
Plan of dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 develops the theoretical argument, 
which focuses on the trade-offs faced by voters and incumbent politicians when deciding over 
fiscal policy in the context of a principal-agent framework of public finance. In the framework, 
an incumbent decides between providing a public good or spend public resources in items that 





conditional on the level of public goods received. The chapter shows how the structure of public 
finance (e.g. where does revenue come from?) informs these choices and concludes by providing 
a number of hypotheses on the expected behavior of fiscal policy over the business and electoral 
cycle.  
The theoretical exposition is followed by two empirical chapters that test the propositions 
derived from the argument by exploiting cross-sectional and time-series variation in fiscal policy 
outcomes.  In chapter 2, I look at the determinants of fiscal procyclicality, and show how 
windfall dependence affects the behavior of fiscal policy over the business cycle in a sample of 
more than one hundred countries observed over a forty-year period. In chapter 3, I study the 
behavior of fiscal policy in the proximity of elections, trying to identify interactions with the 
revenue foundations of democratic governments. In particular, the chapter focuses on the role of 
fiscal windfalls in generating electorally induced fluctuations in the budget in a sample of more 
than fifty democracies.  
Chapter 4 takes a step back and examines more closely the key assumption of the theory: 
that voters should have less information about public budgets in the presence of large fiscal 
windfalls. In particular, I study whether reliance on fiscal windfalls makes it harder for voters to 
‘pierce the veil’ of budgetary accounts and infer the true fiscal stance of the government. In the 
absence of cross-national survey data on voter awareness about these issues, I tackle the problem 
through the lens of fiscal transparency. Based on a cross-sectional analysis encompassing 117 
countries, I study whether countries that rely on non-tax revenue to finance public expenditures 
tend to have lower levels of fiscal transparency, as assumed by the theory. 
The last empirical chapter, Chapter 5, moves away from the cross-national exercises of 





data. Exploiting the recent off-shore oil boom in Brazil, and based on a sample of more than 
5000 municipalities observed between 2000 and 2009, this chapter explores the connection 
between oil wealth and fiscal transparency and the way elections and windfall wealth interact to 
affect the levels and composition of local government expenditures. Finally, in the Conclusion, I 
review the theory and empirical findings from the previous chapters and highlight the ways in 
which a focus on voters leads to novel predictions about the behavior of fiscal policy. I close the 






Chapter 1. Theory: A principal-agent framework of public finance 
 
Procyclical fiscal policy is a pervasive feature across the developing world. Whether the fiscal 
instrument of choice to measure such behavior is government spending (Kaminsky et al. 2004), 
the tax rate (Vegh and Vuletin 2012), or fiscal outcomes such as the budget balance (Alesina et 
al. 2008), the empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that governments in developing 
countries find it hard to smooth fiscal policy over the business cycle. The typical behavior 
observed is one where during booms, government spending increases, tax rates decrease, and the 
fiscal balance deteriorates, and the opposite occurs during recessions: spending goes down, tax 
rates increase, and the fiscal balance improves. While during the last decade several developing 
countries have been able to overcome the procyclical policy bias (Chile), and some industrial 
countries (Greece) turned procyclical over the same period (Frenkel et al. 2011), the consensus is 
that the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy differs significantly across income groups.  
 Why would policymakers in developing countries pursue procyclical fiscal policy? After 
all, such a policy stance cannot be optimal. From a macro-perspective, procyclicality tends to 
reinforce the business cycle, exacerbating booms and aggravating busts. In addition, 
procyclicality tends to hurt the most vulnerable groups in society since the poor lack the assets to 
smooth out adverse income shocks. Finally, while theoretical models of optimal fiscal policy 
(e.g. neo classical tax smoothing, and Keynessian models) disagree about the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy in stabilizing output fluctuations, both traditions of economic theory do agree that, 
as a general rule, running procyclical policy is sub-optimal. Thus, theoretical reasons as well as 






According to tax smoothing prescriptions, governments should use budget surpluses and 
deficits as buffers to prevent tax rates from changing too sharply. In this theory, governments 
will run deficits in times of high government spending needs (e.g. wars, recessions) and 
surpluses when needs are low (e.g. peace, booms). Underlying the approach is the assumption 
that governments are benevolent. This chapter departs from this assumption and presents a 
theory in which reelection-seeking politicians make public spending decisions and voters decide 
whether to keep or oust the incumbent in the context of a principal-agent framework of elections.  
Within this setup, I introduce two frictions in the political process that will affect 
spending patterns over the business cycle. First, politicians can divert part of the public budget to 
spend it on items that benefit themselves, at the expense of voters (e.g. rents). Secondly, I 
assume that the amount of information available to voters about public budgets is not 
homogenous across political systems, but is in part, a function of the structure of public finance 
(where revenue comes from?). I distinguish between tax revenues and fiscal windfalls as two 
different sources of government revenue. I argue that the intrinsic informational implications of 
each differ, and that voters will have less information about the true state of public finance, and 
thus, the extent of rent extraction on behalf of incumbent politicians, when fiscal windfalls 
represent a large share of total revenues. 
The theory emphasizes a number key trade-offs for both politicians and voters when 
making decisions over fiscal policy. From the perspective of politicians, incumbents would like 
to spend all public monies on rents, but need to provide some level of public goods in order to 
get reelected. From the perspective of voters, citizens would like governments to save resources 





may fear politicians will end up allocating saved public resources on projects that don’t benefit 
them.    
The way such trade-offs are solved is affected by a key parameter of the theory: the 
structure of public finance, which in turn affects the amount of information available to voters 
about how much fiscal revenue is up for grabs for incumbent politicians. When windfalls make 
up a large share of the total budget, voters are less informed about the total revenue base 
available to incumbents. This informational asymmetry, in the face of a positive economic shock, 
leads voters to demand higher levels of public goods for themselves in order to limit the rent-
seeking behavior of politicians. If voters didn't make such demands, opportunistic politicians 
would choose to spend the windfall in goods that are not as valued by the voters. The down-side 
is that such demands generate a procyclical bias in fiscal policy: voters demand public goods 
during good times and incumbent’s supply in order to stay in power. Thus, not only procyclical 
policy is obtained but also a political budget cycle (the tendency for fiscal variables to fluctuate 
across the electoral calendar), is likely to emerge in these contexts. In sum, an information gap 
characterizing electoral competition in democracies that rely extensively on fiscal windfalls is 
the key micro-foundation linking the structure of public finance to procyclicality and electoral 










By exploring why fiscal policy is procyclical in some countries and not others, this chapter 
contributes to a theoretical literature focused on the political determinants of government’s 
capabilities to adjust public policy to changing economic conditions (Battaglini and Coate 2007; 
2008a, b). With one exception (Alesina et al. 2008), previous research on the subject has 
neglected the role of voters and elections in shaping the incentives for fiscal behavior over the 
business cycle. Drawing on a principal-agent framework of public finance allows me to shed 
light on a new mechanism to explain variation in levels of procyclicality across countries. 
Secondly, the theory developed next connects two phenomena that have so far been studied 
separately: procyclical policy and political budget cycles, which I argue have similar political 
foundations. Finally, the framework speaks directly to a literature discussing the political 
Initial conditions 
• Natural resource wealth 
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conditions that allow voters to reduce the rents captured by politicians (Adserà et al. 2003; 
Persson et al. 1997; 2000). While this literature is primarily concerned with the role of political 
institutions (e.g. checks and balances) in reducing rent seeking incentives, the framework 
developed here adds a different source of variation in rent seeking opportunites: the structure of 
public finance, or the sources of government revenue. It suggests that each government source 
(taxes, windfalls) is associated with a particular “informational regime”, making voters more or 
less able to control the extent of rent extraction by politicians. The goal of the framework is to 
develop the incentives such regimes generate for both voters and politicians, along with the 
policy implications that derive from each. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a background on principal agent 
models of public finance, the building block for the argument developed during the chapter. 
After stating the key assumptions of the theory (section 2), Sections 3 and 4 develop the 
argument and main testable hypotheses. Section 5 covers the scope conditions of the argument. 
Conclusions follow.  
 
1.1 Background 
The theoretical approach developed here follows the principal-agent framework of elections first 
introduced by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), as applied to public finance issues in textbook 
treatments such as Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 4) and Besley (2006, chapter 4). In 
general, political agency models of elections represent the democratic process as a game in 
which the players are voters and politicians. Politicians get to decide some dimension or vector 
of fiscal policy (the tax rate, government spending, debt) and voters decide retrospectively 





Political agency models of public finance differ along at least three important 
dimensions.10 First, a key point of departure is whether the pool of available candidates from 
which voters can chose from is homogenous (Persson et al. 1997), or politicians differ in their 
type or quality, such as competence or honesty levels (Caselli and Morelli 2004).11 Second, the 
motivation of politicians for holding office can be diverse. Some models assume “opportunistic” 
politicians: following Downs (1957), politicians formulate policies in order to win elections, 
rather than win elections in order to formulate policies. Politicians are therefore “office seeking” 
and will chose platforms at the electoral stage in order to maximize the probability of victory and 
reelection. In contrast, “partisan” models of economic policy (Alesina 1988) and “citizen 
candidate” models of elections (Osborne and Slivinsky 1996; Besley and Coate 1997) assume 
that politicians are not interested in winning per se. Instead parties, or citizens, are ideological in 
that they care about policy outcomes, and represent different constituencies that hold diverse 
positions on economic issues.12 Finally, politicians can be purely rent seeking: they maximize 
revenue for their own private agenda (Brennan and Buchanan 1980).  
The third and final element in political agency models considers the amount of 
information that is available to voters about the policy process, or the nature of uncertainty. In 
moral hazard models, voters are uncertain about the policies or actions of politicians (Barro 
1973; Ferejohn 1986). In adverse selection models of elections, voters are uncertain about 
politician types, such as the level of politician’s competence in providing public goods, and 
                                                
10 See Besley (2006, chapter 3) for a comprehensive discussion. 
  
11 Recent agency models of public finance tend to combine both moral hazard and adverse selection issues (Besley 
and Smart 2007). For a more general treatment of this issue, see Fearon (1999). 
 
12 In particular, parties have different preferences over inflation and unemployment and try to maximize the utility of 
their constituents. Left parties represent the interests of lower middle class groups and unions, and care more about 
unemployment relative to inflation. In contrast, right parties represent upper middle class and business groups and 






policies are used by incumbents to signal their type, especially during electoral years (Rogoff 
1990; Rogoff and Sibert 1988). 
The framework developed next makes choices and assumptions along each of these 
dimensions. First, I assume a pool of ex ante identical candidates from where a challenger is 
selected so that elections serve the purpose of holding incumbents accountable for bad behavior 
ex post. Secondly, I take politicians to combine opportunistic and rent-seeking incentives, so that 
incumbent’s tradeoff spending public revenues on personal perks and implementing policies 
conducive to reelection.13 Finally, I introduce a novel source of informational asymmetry 
between voters and politicians, one that derives from the structure of public finance and has been 
so far overlooked in studies of fiscal procyclicality. By exploring the informational implications 
of tax revenues and fiscal windfalls, I propose a rationale for why it is the case that certain 
political systems make it difficult for voters to know exactly what is the true state of public 
finance, and derive the effects that such informational regimes produce on policy behavior. 
 
1.2 Assumptions 
Consider a political system including two time periods: in each, an incumbent makes decisions 
about government spending, between periods, there is an election in which a representative voter 
chooses between an incumbent politician and an identical challenger. To reflect changes in the 
business cycle, suppose the economy can be either in a “boom” or in a “recession”.14  
                                                
13 The assumption of opportunistic, as opposed to partisan, politicians in this framework is grounded on two fronts: 
first, a certain degree of office seeking behavior seems necessary in any model of the policy process, given that all 
politicians (be they partisan or not) need to win elections first in order to make policy decisions afterwards. More 
importanly, the behavior of fiscal policy over the cycle is a “common value” policy, or issue that does not divide 
across partisan lines: both parties on the right and left tend to agree on the costs of running procylical policy. For 
right wing parties, over-spending during good times may lead to inflation, For left wing partisans, a procyclical 
policy bias during booms may hamper attempts at protecting their key constituents (the poor) during bad times. 
 






The incumbent chooses to provide a level of public goods, which are valuable to voters, 
the tax rate, and a level of rent extraction, that is, goods that benefit politicians but not the 
general citizen. Politicians are opportunistic and rent-seeking: they care about grabbing rents for 
themselves, and enjoy other exogenous benefits from being in office (ego rents). The 
representative citizen derives utility from the provision of public goods net of taxes. The value of 
public goods to citizens varies across time periods: the marginal utility of public spending is 
higher during recessions than during booms. In other words, to the extent that private 
consumption and public goods are substitutes, government expenditures (e.g. social transfers) 
serve mainly an insurance function. 15 Importantly, note that this feature biases the theory against 
procyclical policies, a bias the frictions I introduce next will need to overcome. 
To represent the structure of public finance, let government’s revenue be a function of 
two main elements: taxes (T), and fiscal windfalls (W). While interesting comparative statics 
may emerge from situations in which both sources of revenue are important sources of 
government income, I assume for simplicity that only one these components tends to dominate in 
every political system, as shown in Figure 1 (Introduction), and keeping with the stylized 
observation of a negative correlation between access to windfall revenue and general levels of 
domestic taxation. As a consequence, each political system is associated with a particular 
informational regime, defined here as the extent of information that voters have about the 
availability and use of public resources by incumbent politicians. 
In particular, the information structure is defined as follows. Voters observe public good 
provision and how much they are paying in taxes. But they do not observe government rents, and 
                                                
15 Another way to think about this is the following: assume if all private income is consumed by the representative 
citizen (there is no access to credit markets), then under this condition, government spending serves an insurance 






in the context of political systems characterized by dependence on W, the windfall revenue 
shock is only observed by the incumbent. While the former assumption seems easy to justify, the 
latter needs some further elaboration.  
 The theory’s key assumption is that the inferences that voters can draw about the full 
revenue base that is available to governments depend on the structure of public finance. In 
general, fiscal windfalls and taxation have different implications in terms of the information that 
is available to voters about government’s activities. Specifically, I assume that fiscal windfalls 
(e.g. oil royalties, grants, intergovernmental transfers) are intrinsically less transparent than 
general taxation for two main reasons. The first reason is the revenue collection technology of 
each revenue source: fiscal windfalls accrue directly to government coffers, without any need of 
private collection from citizens.16 Given this unmediated collection technology, voters lack a 
precise estimate of fiscal windfalls (they are less visible than taxes), so these can be more “easily 
stolen” than revenue flowing from general taxation.17 
The second reason follows the first, and revolves around the notion of informational 
rents. It is reasonable to assume that incumbents in both tax and windfall political systems have 
access to much better information about the budget than the population at large, thus creating 
room for potential abuse by the holders of public office. However, I argue that the level of 
information asymmetry, and thus, the extent potential abuse, increases with the share of W in the 
total budget. As a consequence, the informational rents provided by fiscal windfalls conspire 
against investment in transparency-enhancing reforms in the fiscal process by incumbents. Since 
                                                
16 More formally, the realized value of  the revenue shock, W, is known only to the incumbent. 
 
17 At this point, one could make the case that even different taxes (direct, indirect) or tax systems as a whole (single 
source, multiplicity of tax sources) vary in levels of “visibility”, and thus, impact voter’s perceptions about the costs 
of public goods, or what the Public Choice school dubs as “fiscal illusion” (Buchanan 1967; Buchanan and Wagner 
1977). However, here I want to emphasize the variation induced by an often overlook difference between tax and 






fiscal windfalls help to increase total budget size, this provides room for incumbents to grab 
political rents, while at the same time avoid disappointing rational but imperfectly informed 
voters (Brollo et al. 2010). In other words, if taxes and spending are imperfect means of 
detecting rent extraction (Besley 2006), I argue that fiscal windfalls make this calculation even 
more difficult for voters.18 
 
However, within the setup, lack of information about fiscal windfall availability is not 
absolute. Voters may infer the total revenue shock in a windfall environment from movements in 
commodity prices, which are relatively easy to access.19 Yet, such signal is relatively noisy, and 
is contingent on the fiscal regime that links international commodity prices and government’s 
coffers. Moreover, to the extent that individual taxpayers are able to see some connection 
between the level of public services provided and their own tax burden, this implies a link 
between expenditures and own contributions to the fisc, and thus, a way of keeping track of 
politician’s rent seeking behavior. Such links are broken when windfall revenue makes up a large 
share of the total budget, which implies that voters may have a hard time trying to tie the hands 
of opportunistic politicians. In sum, the key assumption in this theory is that the representative 
citizen has more information about the taxes she pays than on the fiscal windfall the government 
receives. 
Regarding this last point, note that a long tradition in political science argues that the 
effects of taxation vis a vis windfall revenue are behavioral rather than informational: when 
voters pay taxes they have more incentives to monitor closely politicians and enforce budgetary 
                                                
18 The implicit assumption here is that voters do not regard their own tax payments as being independent of the 
benefits of the public goods and services that they receive (more on this later). 
 
19 Formally, the structure of voter information can be given as follows:  with some probability, W can be high or low 
and voters receive a signal of the windfall equal to the true state of the world with a probability slightly greater than 






oversight than when they don’t (Bates and Lien 1985; Levi 1988; Brautigam et al. 2008).20 
According to this conventional perspective, -the endowment effect, in Sandbu’s (2005) 
terminology- the lack of motivation that originates from not paying taxes results in a more 
politically quiescent population and thus, weaker restraints on opportunistic politicians, and even 
more, low levels of democracy (Ross 2001; Moore 2007).21 This conventional perspective thus 
relies on strong assumptions about specific psychological traits or dispositions that make 
individuals in windfall environments somehow different from voters that pay higher taxes on a 
regular basis. The argument proposed here need not rely on such assumptions about differences 
in individual motivations. Instead, voters differ in their ability to infer how much revenue the 
government obtains from non-tax revenue sources, which is an informational constraint that 
operates and can be measured at the context, rather than individual, level.22  
Further, I argue that voters in windfall contexts do not behave as passive principals as 
assumed by the conventional wisdom: on the contrary, the main argument proposed here is that 
procyclical policy is driven by voters who in the context of informational asymmetries, demand 
public goods to limit rent extraction by incumbents. However, voters in both contexts differ on 
their ability (not motivation) to learn about the true fiscal stance of the government: the more or 
less intrinsic informational benefits that paying taxes brings about are simply lacking in windfall 
environments. Having described the framework’s setup and assumptions, several implications 
regarding the behavior of fiscal policy over the business cycle follow. First, I introduce a 
                                                
20 See Paler (2011) for an insightful micro-level (experimental) analysis of the behavioral effects of different types 
of revenue sources (taxation vs. windfall) in the Indonesian context. 
 
21 This conventional view has been recently challenged (Haber and Menaldo 2011). To the extent that oil may have 
non-democratic effects, it seems to be conditional on other factors, like inequality (Dunning 2008), or geographic 
location (e.g. in Latin America oil has not been an impediment to democratic advancement). 
 
22 Moreover, the endowment and informational mechanisms can work as complementary, rather than as alternative 
explanations:	  	  even in a country where citizens are motivated enough, it will be hard for them to monitor incumbent 





normative benchmark through which to compare the results obtained when fiscal policy is the 
outcome of a very stylized political process.  
 
1.3 Optimal fiscal policy 
In a world of benevolent social planners, fiscal policy should be countercyclical or at 
least acyclical. Since the benevolent planner would capture no rents, all government revenue is 
spent on public goods, and the source of government income, or the structure of public finanace, 
is irrelevant to the quality of spending. Under this scenario, there is no reason for voters to 
demand higher utility for themselves by over-demanding public goods in good times. In this 
context, public debt is issued in times of high spending needs (wars, recessions) and surpluses 
are accumulated during good times to repay fully previous period borrowing. Figure 1.2 provides 
an illustration of the spending pattern that would be obtained when a benevolent social planner 
that maximizes voter utility chooses fiscal policy over the business cycle. The bold line 
represents the ups and downs of the economy (and thus, how much revenue the govt. has access 
to). Note that public spending, G, increases steadily or acyclically at the long-term rate of growth 
of real income. Thus, the ratio of G to GDP should go down during booms and up in recessions.  










1.4 Political equilibrium and hypotheses 
In the world of opportunistic/rent seeking politicians and imperfect information of the 
current setup, deviations from the optimal policy benchmark introduced above are common. To 
illustrate, suppose the economy is hit by a positive income shock (a boom) and the share of taxes 
in the total budget is large relative to windfall revenue. Since taxes make the bulk of government 
revenues, voters have (by assumption) more information about the total budget available to the 
incumbent, thus the latter’s capacity to hide public funds for private uses is more limited. Under 
this situation, voters can make state-contingent contracts with politicians:  the implicit contract 
between the representative citizen and the incumbent can be summarized in the following phrase: 
“tax me, but spend it well, or else...” 
That is, in reacting to government policies, voters do not regard their own tax revenue as 
being independent of the services they receive. Although imperfectly, taxes and spending 
provide citizens with the means of detecting rent extraction by politicians. Armed with 
information provided by their own contributions to the fisc, voters can credibly punish politicians 
who engage in fiscal profligacy, so incumbents will therefore be less inclined to mismanage 
public finance over the business cycle, leading to a situation of either acyclical or countercyclical 
spending. 
 Now suppose that the same positive income shock (in the form of a commodity boom) is 
realized in an economy where fiscal windfalls make a substantive share of total revenues. 
Increasing the share W in total revenue produces two effects: (1) decreases the amount of 
information the representative citizen has on the total revenue base, and (2) increases the extent 





elections, what is the optimal performance cutoff rule for re-election that a representative voter 
could come up with?  
For starters, note that the marginal value of public spending is lower for voters in good 
times, which biases preferences against procyclical policy. However, effects (1) and (2) stated 
above make voters wary about how incumbent’s will spend windfall revenue, that is, they are 
concerned about the allocation decision between public goods and rents. Given this 
informational asymmetry, this leads voters to raise their reservation utility and demand higher 
levels of public good provision in good times than would be expected under a perfect 
information scenario (or where taxes dominate). If they did not make such procyclical demands, 
rent-seeking politicians would choose to spend windfall revenues on goods that are not as valued 
by the voters (e.g. favors to special interests, personal perks). In response, the incumbent is 
tempted to spend too much in the current period (with less left for later in the case of a negative 
shock to the economy). The downside is that such pressures generate a procyclical bias in fiscal 
policy.23 At the same time, note that the demand for public goods by voters is met from the 
supply side by opportunistic politicians who are likely to tinker with the budget, especially 
during electoral years, in order to influence electoral outcomes. Since relative to incumbents in 
tax environments, politicians in windfall contexts tend to enjoy the political benefit of spending 
but pay only a small fraction of the political cost of taxation, we should expect these authorities 
to use low-cost spending power to remain in office. In sum, there exists an informational gap in 
countries that are heavily reliant on fiscal windfalls, and such informational regime provides the 
                                                
23 In this vein, procyclical policy therefore, seems part of a broader set of “populist” policies which in the short run 
recieve support from a significant fraction of the population, but ultimately end up hurting their economic interests. 
See Dornbuch and Edwards (1991) for examples on such populist episodes during Latin America’s economic 
history, and Acemoglu et al. (2011) for a  recent formal model of the conditions that sustain populist policies in 






basis for voters to make procyclical demands and incumbents ready to supply public spending in 
order to stay in power. 
But why can’t voters simply demand more transparency in windfall environments instead 
of public goods? At least two factors conspire against this more efficient alternative. First, it is 
important to note that fiscal transparency is one among a variety of budgetary institutions, which, 
as any institution, is relatively hard to change in the short run. Additionally, because of the 
informational rents that fiscal windfalls produce, incumbents are less likely to modify such 
institutions in the direction that would be optimal for voters. Finally, if in addition to the above, 
one imposes the plausible assumption of voter shortsightedness or impatience, then the room for 
transparency-increasing demands on behalf of voters is even more limited. 
In sum, the discussion above suggests two hypotheses and one assumption amenable to 
empirical testing in a cross-national context:  
 
Assumption 1.Voters ability to be informed about budget processes is limited in countries that 
are heavily reliant on windfall revenue to finance public expenditures. 
H1. Levels of fiscal procyclicality should be higher in countries that depend mostly on windfall 
revenue to finance public expenditures. 
H2. A political budget cycle is likely to emerge in countries that are heavily reliant on fiscal 
windfalls. 
 
1.5 Scope conditions 
 The argument presented here is cast in terms of a representative voter and incumbent who 





non-democratic regimes should be less procyclical than democratic countries; rather, what 
matters for the argument is the variation in fiscal policy behavior induced by the structure of 
public finance across democracies. Thus, the argument is not intended to encompass theoretical 
debates or the empirical literature on the effects of regime type on economic policy, which is 
discussed elsewhere (Rodrik 2000; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Mullingan et al. 2004).  
Additionally, by assuming a very stylized model of the policy process with a single 
policymaker, the argument abstracts from exploring how the form of government or the electoral 
rule interacts with the revenue foundations to generate different public spending dynamics. 
However, in presenting the theory this way, the argument seems more likely to hold in 
presidential or parliamentary regimes with majoritarian features and less likely to travel in 
political systems with parliamentary/proportional representation or presidential regimes with 
stronger checks and balances or higher number of veto players.24   
Third, the theoretical argument is presented in rather general terms, but may have less 
bite in some contexts than in others. Specifically, the argument assumes that the access to fiscal 
windfalls (such as oil rents) is controlled and owned by the government. Variation in “ownership 
structure” across resource rich countries is thus omitted. While the assumption is empirically 
valid for the most part of the period under analysis (1960-2000s) where the vast majority of 
hydrocarbon-rich countries did, in fact, exercise state ownership over their natural resources, the 
logic of the argument may be weaker for other time periods or countries in which the oil sector’s 
governance structure is more complex, as seems to be the case in former Soviet countries (Jones 
Luong and Weinthtal 2010). 
                                                
24 On the effects of political institutions on fiscal policy, see Persson and Tabellini (2003). Andersen (2011) provides 





Finally, it is important to mention that while both the argument and empirical evidence 
that comes next are cast mostly, but not only, in terms of the impact oil rents on fiscal policy, the 
approach developed here goes beyond the traditional “resource curse” literature. To the extent 
that foreign aid, oil revenue, or intergovernmental transfers (for the case of a subnational 
government) share important similarities (low levels of transparency), we should expect this 
argument to apply to such settings. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter developed an argument that builds on a principal-agent framework of public 
finance to explain variation in fiscal policy reactions to exogenous shocks. It differs from much 
of the existing literature on procyclicality by placing voters at the center of analysis. The theory 
posits that under some conditions, voters will demand public spending in good times in order to 
“tie the hands” of rent-seeking politicians and force them to spend on goods that are valued by 
them, inducing a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. 
The main insight of this theory is that these conditions depend, in part, on the way 
governments finance those public goods that voters demand. The argument posits that each 
source of government revenue (taxes vs. windfalls) is associated with a particular informational 
regime: what voters may or may not observe regarding government’s fiscal activities. In 
particular, fiscal windfalls (oil revenues, foreign aid, transfers) are assumed to be less 
transparent than general taxation, making voters more uncertain about the true state of public 
finance when W is large relative to T. As a result, the extent of the rent extraction problem is 
particularly acute in windfall environments. To deal with the issue of informational asymmetries, 





rainy day, when government expenditures are more valuable. Thus, procyclical policy is driven 
by voters’ demands. 
Existing theoretical literature has tended to underplay the role of voters by focusing 
exclusively on interest group rivalries in shaping fiscal policy outcomes.25 However, to the 
extent that government’s spending decisions can affect the incumbent’s likelihood of remaining 
in power, such omission precludes extant scholarship from studying the electoral dimension of 
fiscal policy-making. This simplified framework provides the potential to overcome such 




                                                





Chapter 2. Fiscal windfalls and procyclicality 
 
How do countries, through their political institutions, adapt their public policies to economic 
shocks? For example, how should countries decide fiscal policy in response to the business 
cycle? Standard tax smoothing (Barro 1979) and Keynesian models imply that fiscal policy 
should follow either an acyclical or countercyclical pattern: government spending should go 
down during booms and up during bad times. What does the empirical evidence show? While the 
above policy prescriptions are followed to a great extent in the developed world, government 
expenditures in many developing countries are actually procyclical, that is, a tendency for 
governments to expand public spending in good times and contract it during recessions (Akitoby 
et al. 2004; Kaminsky et al. 2004; Talvi and Vegh 2005). For example, Figure 2.1 plots the 
correlation between the cyclical components of real government expenditures and real GDP 
between 1960 and 2003, against the log of GDP per capita in 103 countries.  














The negative correlation between the degree of fiscal procyclicality and per capita wealth is 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. Notice that while most of the 
countercyclical countries are clustered in the developed world, there is a handful of developing 
countries that depart from the general rule of procyclicality.26 
Moreover, using a regression based measure of procyclicality27, Table 1 shows that total 
public spending reacts positively (and more than proportionally) to output shocks in developing 
countries only, while across the OECD the sign of the coefficient is essentially zero, implying on 
average, acyclical responses in accordance with tax smoothing prescriptions, regardless of 
whether country fixed effects (FE) are included or not. 









Finally, it is worth noticing that the variation in policy behavior between developed and 
developing countries is not only observed at the level of aggregate expenditures. Rather, it 
extends to some key components of public outlays, such as expenditures on education and health, 
which have been found to be especially procyclical in developing countries in general (Arze del 
                                                
26 South Korea, Colombia, and Jamaica are some of these exceptions in the dataset. Note that there are also OECD 
countries that depart from the typical countercyclical pattern (e.g. Ireland, Greece, and Portugal). 
27 See Appendix 2.1 for details on the measure. 
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Granado et al. 2010; Wibbels 2006), and Latin America in particular (Snyder and Yackovlev 
2000; Wodon et al. 2000; Braun and di Gresia 2003). As an example of the procyclical behavior 
of social policies in developing countries, Figure 2.2 shows the correlation between the cyclical 
components of real GDP, and real social expenditures per capita for the seven largest countries in 
Latin America from 1990 to 2008, using data from ECLAC.28 With one exception, the rest of the 
countries have tended to expand social expenditures during good times, only to adjust them at the 
worst of times. 
 










It is hard to underestimate the costs of procyclical fiscal policies, both in terms of their 
impact on aggregate welfare as well as their distributive consequences. Firstly, procyclicality 
seems to be in part a manifestation of the more general problem of (macroeconomic) policy 
volatility, traditionally considered a major determinant of economic performance (Ramey and 
                                                




















Ramey 1995; Aghion et al. 2006).29 For example, as shown by Figure 2.3, procyclicality is 
positively correlated with a measure of discretionary fiscal spending30, which has been found 
harmful for macroeconomic stability and economic growth in previous studies (Fatas and Mihov 
2003; 2005; Perry et al. 2007). 
 












Secondly, a procyclical policy bias hampers attempts at protecting the most vulnerable 
groups during recessions (Hicks and Wodon 2001; Ravallion 2002). The poor are usually less 
able to cope with negative economic shocks because they: a) have limited access to credit 
                                                
29 However, more recent research finds no evidence that macroeconomic policies per se are a significant predictor of 
economic performance, especially after controlling for proxies for institutional quality (Acemoglu et al 2003; 
Easterly 2005). 
 
30 The term discretionary fiscal policy refers to changes in spending that do not represent a reaction to current 
macroeconomic conditions (Fatas and Mihov 2003, p. 1422). It is measured as the volatility of the ε term in a 
regression of the following form: ΔG=α+βΔY+δW+ε where G is government speding, Y is GDP and W other 





































































































markets, b) have more informal and unstable jobs, c) do not have diversified assets that they can 
sell to smooth consumption, and d) they may suffer long-term effects from recessions, such as 
usually irreversible loss of human capital due to the consequences of malnutrition, loss of health, 
or loss of education (Lustig 2000; Braun and diGresia 2003). Thus, in the context of a fiscal 
adjustment, the overall effectiveness of social policy at protecting the poor is reduced during 
downturns (DeFerranti et al 2000).31 In sum, exploring the determinants of procyclical spending 
biases in the developing world remains of crucial importance. 
Why do many developing countries follow seemingly suboptimal procyclical fiscal and 
social policies that add to macroeconomic instability and hurt the poor the most? The first 
generation of scholarship tended to focus on the economic causes of procyclicality. For example, 
Gavin and Perotti's (1997) seminal contribution argued that developing countries find it hard to 
follow countercyclical policy because they lack access to international credit during recessions, 
suggesting that any explanation of procyclical behavior needs to take into account credit 
constraints or limited creditworthiness. However, the problem with this economic explanation is 
its inability to provide answers to the following: why can't countries self-insure by accumulating 
fiscal resources in good times? Why would lenders not provide funds to countries if they were 
convinced that borrowing would help smooth out the cycle in the first place? 
To answer these questions, one needs to look at the political arena in general, and on the 
interaction between voters and elected politicians under different fiscal scenarios in particular. 
The basic argument of this chapter is that the revenue basis of governments should be considered 
a key explanatory variable in accounting for variation in levels of fiscal procyclicality. More 
specifically, I argue that countries that are relatively more dependant on non-tax revenue or fiscal 
                                                







windfalls (e.g. oil, minerals, foreign aid) to finance public expenditures will tend to have a hard 
time adapting public policy in the right direction: on average these countries will show higher 
levels of fiscal procyclicality. 
Why is this so? As explained in the previous chapter, when countries finance most of 
their spending from windfalls, citizens lack information about how much resources the 
government has and its use, since this type of revenue flows directly to the government coffers, 
without any need for collection of private income from citizens. This lack of information or 
transparency in windfall environments leads voters to demand more public goods in good times, 
generating a procyclical bias in public spending. If voters did not make such demands, 
opportunistic politicians would choose to spend the windfall in goods that are not as valued by 
the voters (e.g. favors to special interests, personal perks). In sum, there exists an information 
gap (to be shown in chapter 4) characterizing electoral competition in democracies that rely 
extensively on fiscal windfalls, and that this is one of the sources of variation in levels of 
procyclicality across countries, which is the focus of this chapter. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the literature on the political 
economy of procyclical spending and highlights the chapter’s contribution to it. Section 2 
provides both cross-sectional and time-varying empirical evidence that is consistent with the 
argument that procyclicality is linked to the revenue foundations of governments.  
 
2.1 Political economy of procyclical spending: related literature 
 
Political economy explanations of fiscal outcomes build on the idea that fiscal decisions are the 





mainly between politicians and voters, and between politicians that represent diverse interests or 
constituencies. In this tradition, scholars have identified a number of political distortions that 
tend to generate a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. These distortions can be grouped in two types 
of problems: "cooperation" and "principal agent" problems. 
 
Cooperation problems. A classic example of a cooperation problem is the well-known common 
pool problem (Ostrom, 1990).32 In fiscal policy, the common pool is the budget that political 
players draw upon (financed from a general tax fund) to generate concentrated benefits (such as 
targeted public policies). Tornell and Lane (1999) develop a model in which multiple political 
groups compete for a share of the common pool, leading to a "voracity effect": a more than 
proportional increase in spending in response to an exogenous shock, such as a terms of trade 
windfall. Similarly, Talvi and Vegh (2005) advance a model in which abundant fiscal resources 
create pressures to increase public spending during booms. One problematic feature of these 
early models is that the voracity effect is simply assumed, but not analytically derived. Thus, 
subsequent scholarship has focused on the factors determine the intensity of the voracity effect 
across countries, and hence, variation in levels of fiscal procyclicality.  
First of all, the number of actors drawing from the common pool has been found to be a 
relevant determinant of the voracity effect. The pressure to overspend during upturns increases as 
the number of groups increase. Braun (2001) and Lane (2003) find evidence consistent with this 
hypothesis for developing and OECD countries respectively: as the number of political veto 
players increases, fiscal policy becomes more procyclical. 
                                                
32 In this chapter, cooperation problems refer to the game played by multiple political actors with heterogeneous 






In addition to fragmentation, political polarization has also been hypothesized as a key 
determinant of procyclicality (Humphreys and Sandbu 2007; Ilzetzki 2009; Woo 2009). The 
intuition is that as the preferences over the desired distribution of public spending between 
political groups diverge (or more generally, the deeper the division prevalent among the groups), 
the greater will be the incentive of policymakers to spend too much while in power, leading to 
procyclical fiscal policies. 
 
Principal-agent problems. In the cooperation models reviewed above, the role of voters is 
theoretically underspecified. This omission is particularly problematic if one is concerned about 
endogeneity issues: expenditure decisions can affect the politician's likelihood of remaining in 
power, and if such consequences can be anticipated, one would expect politician's to modify 
their behavior accordingly. Moreover, these models seem to neglect a basic tenet of electoral 
competition: that politicians devote public resources to remain in office and incumbents may 
engage in pre and post electoral fiscal manipulations (e.g. political budget cycles) to influence 
voters and retain power, a practice that is specially recurrent across the developing world (Ames 
1987; Schuknecht 2000; Brender and Drazen 2004; Shi and Svensson 2006). 
In an important exception, Alesina et al. (2008) develop a political agency model that 
brings voters back into the picture. The model is used to interpret their main empirical finding: a 
positive correlation between procyclical policy and measures of political corruption. They argue 
that procyclicality is driven by rational voters who in the context of information asymmetries33 
and corrupt governments, demand higher utility for themselves (in the form of public goods) 
                                                






during good times in a "Starve the Leviathan" fashion. Faced with these procyclical demands, 
governments do not accumulate reserves during booms; on the contrary, they incur large debts.  
The theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter shares important similarities 
with the Alesina et al. model. However, it tries to overcome two key limitations of their analysis. 
First, at the theoretical level, it remains unclear from their model what is the exact source of 
variation in voter’s level of information, in other words, why are some voters more informed 
than others? In the framework presented in Chapter 1, the revenue foundations of governments 
provide the answer this puzzle. Secondly, a problem with their key explanatory variable, 
corruption, is that of a simple form of endogeneity. More specifically, an explanation of 
procyclicality based on corruption seems to lack causal depth (Kitschelt 2003), to the extent that 
such variable is the result of deeper historical, institutional, and structural factors. In the 
forthcoming analysis, I exploit the fact that natural resources (e.g. oil reserves) are randomly 
distributed across countries, to study the effects of windfall revenue on fiscal policy outcomes. 
 
2.2 Fiscal windfalls and procyclicality: comparative evidence 
Data. Based on a sample of 103 countries for the period 1960-2003 (See Appendix Table A2.1), 
I consider real government spending as an indicator of fiscal policy.34 I employ two measures of 
procyclicality. First, following Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) I use the correlation 
coefficient between the cyclical components of real GDP and real government expenditures 
between 1960 and 2003 to exploit cross-sectional variation. To explore time-variation in the 
data, I employ a regression-based measure of procyclicality (see Appendix for details). 
                                                
34 The spending variable includes central government consumption, investment, transfers, and interest payments. 
Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) show that for studying the cyclical properties of fiscal policy in developing countries, there 
are no differences between looking at government consumption in isolation or at aggregate expenditures as done 





Before testing the plausibility of the argument, I start the empirical analysis by looking at 
the economic determinants of procyclicality. As pointed out in the introduction, a common 
reason to explain procyclical fiscal policy has to do with tight credit constraints (Gavin and 
Perotti 1997). According to this argument, procyclicality is mostly driven by a debt limit, and 
should be especially present during downturns. Thus, if the borrowing constraint argument is the 
only story in town, we should observe a positive beta coefficient (procyclicality) in a recession, 
but not in a boom.35 Contrary to this expectation, I find policy to be procyclical during booms as 
well as in recessions in developing countries (Table 2.2). Note also that in developed countries, 
policy is particularly countercyclical during downturns. 











Moreover, as shown by Table 2.3, there is no evidence that developing countries became 
procyclical only after 1982 (the year of the Mexican debt crisis), when limited creditworthiness 
became a binding issue for many developing nations.  
                                                
35 A boom (recession) is defined as a positive (negative) output gap. 
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These initial results, coupled with empirical evidence showing that that the behavior of fiscal 
policy over the business cycle is asymmetric36 (Balassone and Kumar 2007a), suggest that credit 
constraints cannot be driving exclusively the results across developing countries. This means that 
political economy factors that result in strong pressures for expenditure increase in goods might 
play a more important role than the traditional financial constraint argument in explaining the 
cyclical behavior of fiscal policy. The following subsection explores such political economy 
determinants. 
 
2.2.1 Measuring windfall revenue 
What are the empirical counterparts of fiscal windfalls? The key independent variable to 
consider in this chapter is the yearly share of total government revenue that is financed by oil 
and/or other natural resources. In a study on the connections between taxation and 
democratization, Herb (2005) provides such a proxy by calculating yearly government revenues 
from mineral and oil sources. As shown by Figure 2.4, this proxy is indeed correlated with tax 
                                                
36That is, the degree of procyclicality is higher during good times than bad times. More specifically, the effects of 
automoatic stabilizers are more than offset by discretionary policy when the output gap is positive. This is not the 
case during downturns.  
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effort in the expected direction: the more governments rely on rent or windfall revenues, the less 
need to tax the general population, as measured by the share of indirect taxes on GDP. Thus, the 
rest of the analysis relies on Herb's revenue "rentierism" variable, as our key measure of fiscal 
windfall (FISCALW), to explore its connections to fiscal spending over the business cycle. 
 










2.2.2 Fiscal windfalls and procyclicality: cross-sectional variation 
In this subsection I explore the relationship between resource rents and procyclicality in a cross-
section of countries. Figure 2.5 plots the procyclicality data against the Herb "rentierism" 
measure and shows that the "effect" of windfall revenue on spending is somewhat more acute in 
democracies, suggesting that electoral accountability mechanisms of the type described in 
chapter 1 could be playing a role (The democracy variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the average 















Notice that the picture remains similar using an alterative measure of windfall revenue: 
Morrison's (2009) "non-tax revenue" variable which he defines as "what the government can 
spend without having to tax its citizens". His measure includes not only foreign aid and natural 
resource revenue attained through state-owned enterprises, but also borrowing-from abroad or 
the Central Bank-and all other revenue besides taxation, for example, other state-owned 
enterprise revenue, fines, and so forth (Figure 2.6). 
 











Table 2.4 provides results from a simple OLS estimation in which the procyclicality of 
government expenditures, expressed as the correlation coefficient between the cyclical 
components of real GDP and real public expenditures (1960-2003), is regressed on Herb’s 
measure of fiscal windfall, FISCALW, plus a number of important covariates, such as per capita 
income, government size (central government spending as a percentage of GDP), levels of ethnic 
fractionalization (Alesina et al 2003), institutional variables, and regional dummies.37 
 















                                                
37 All independent variables enter as mean levels for the time period under analysis, except for GDP per capita, that 
takes initial values only. 
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Consistent with conventional wisdom, initial levels of per capita income and government size are 
associated with countercyclical fiscal policy (Akitoby et al. 2004; Braun 2001). Public sector 
size is intended to control for the role of automatic stabilizers in the budget: in countries with 
larger governments, transfers tend to represent a larger portion of total expenditure. These 
transfers-such as unemployment insurance and welfare benefits-tend to increase (decrease) 
automatically during recessions (booms), thus leading to countercyclical policy patterns (Fatas 
and Mihov 2011). 
However, contrary to the expectations of previous political economy literature, the level 
of polarization in society (proxied by the degree of ethnic fractionalization, drawn from Alesina 
et al. 2003) and two different measures of institutional quality: a) control of corruption, from 
World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2001); and b) a measure of the number of 
veto players in the political system, such as checks, drawn from the Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck et al. 2000) were not found to be significant predictors of procyclicality.38  
Finally, the OLS coefficient on FISCALW suggests that the effect of rent revenues on 
procyclicality is economically significant as well: depending on the model estimated, a 1% 
increase in the amount of the budget that is financed by natural resource revenue leads to around 
a 0.5 increase in the level of procyclicality (a variable that ranges on a -1 to 1 scale). 
Nevertheless, one could (rightly) object that the level of "rentierism" is endogenous: 
policymakers have some discretion to affect tax structure and decide how much to depend on 
these resources to finance public expenditures. To deal with this problem, Table 2.5 presents 
results from a two-stage least squares model in which windfall revenue is instrumented on the 
first stage by two proxies of natural resource dependence and abundance, respectively, that lie 
                                                
38 An alternative measure of polarization, such as income inequality, as measured by the Gini index and drawn from 






relatively away from the policymaker’s discretion. Firstly, I instrument the degree of rentierism 
with Ross (2001) natural resource dependence Oil exports variable that measures the export 
value of mineral-based fuels (petroleum, natural gas, and coal) as a fraction of GDP. Secondly, 
the natural resource abundance instrument comes from Dunning's (2008) Oil rents per capita 
measure, defined as the value by year of production of a wide range of natural resources (oil, and 
gas), net of production costs and returns to capital.   
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Note that regardless of the instrument of choice, reliance on natural resource rents is 
systematically related with procyclical fiscal spending. Moreover, using the oil rents per capita 
instrument, Table 2.6 confirms the findings from the previous graphical analysis on the 
relationship between procyclicality, windfalls, and political regimes: the impact of windfalls on 
fiscal policy behavior is especially significant across countries within the democratic camp. Note 
that I control for the presence of presidential regimes in the democratic sample, given that 
previous studies have found fiscal policy dynamics to differ across government forms (Persson 
and Tabellini 2003; Fatas and Mihov 2005; Andersen 2011).  
     
































2.2.3 Resource rents and procyclicality: over time variation 
So far, most of the discussion has concentrated on exploiting cross-sectional variation in the data 
to explain different levels of procyclicality. This approach, while common in the literature, 
suffers from important limitations. In contrast, this subsection takes advantage of the panel 
nature of the data to reflect how changes in my main variable of interest, fiscal windfalls, affect 
fiscal policy outcomes within each country over time. 
 
Empirical strategy. In a panel of yearly data (1960-2003), I estimate the following equation by 
pooling all countries to gain efficiency and introducing country fixed effects, so that the 




where Fit is fiscal policy indicator (government surplus, public spending), OutputGap is a 
measure of the business cycle, defined as the log deviation of GDP from its Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) trend. TOTGap is a measure of terms of trade shocks, defined as the log deviation from a 
HP filtered series of the terms of trade, weighted by the degree of openness of the country 
(exports and imports over GDP) and µi a country fixed effect. The sign of β consistent with 
procyclical behavior depends on the specific measure of fiscal policy: When F is the budget 
balance (government spending), a negative (positive) and statistically significant coefficient 
means that the budget surplus (public expenditures) decreases (increase) with a positive output 





dependent on fiscal windfalls. Hence, I interact the variable OutputGap with the measures used 
in the previous subsection, such as Herb’s fiscal rents (FISCALW) and Ross' Oil exports variable. 
 
Results. Table 2.7 presents results from regressing the change in the fiscal balance (columns 1 
and 2) and public expenditures (columns 3 and 4), both scaled as percentage to GDP, on the 
main variables of interest. The additional regressors, TOTGap, and the lagged dependent 
variable, are included in all specifications but not reported for brevity. In columns 1 and 2, the 
signs of the interaction terms are negative, suggesting that as governments become more 
dependent on fiscal windfalls, the response of the fiscal balance to a boom is procyclical: the 
surplus goes down (deficit increases) in good times.  
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Using the coefficients from Model 2, Figure 2.7 displays the marginal effect of the business 
cycle on the budget balance across the range of values of oil exports, with 95% confidence 
intervals around these estimated effects.  
 












As shown by the Figure, for low values of export dependence, the marginal effect of income 
shocks on the fiscal balance is positive, implying that countries accumulate fiscal resources 
during good times, a pattern that is consistent with prudent fiscal behavior. However, as the share 
of oil exports in GDP increases, this marginal effect becomes negative, that is, the surplus 
(deficit) decreases (increases) during booms, a pattern that is consistent with procyclical fiscal 
policy.  
Moving to the behavior of public expenditures, note that in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7, 




















0 30 60 90





dependent on fiscal windfalls, the response of public spending to output shocks is procyclical. 
Using the coefficients from Model 3, Figure 2.8 displays the marginal effect of income shocks 
on public spending across the range of values of Herb’s rentierism variable (FISCALW), with 
90% confidence intervals around these estimated effects.  
 











It is important to note that the 90% confidence interval overlaps zero for low values of fiscal 
windfalls, suggesting that within that range, the marginal effect of output shocks cannot be 
distinguished from zero statistically, and thus, implying an acyclical response of public 
expenditures to the business cycle in these type of countries. However, as windfalls start to 
explain a significant portion of total fiscal revenue, public expenditures react positively to output 
shocks, implying procyclical fiscal policy. These results, which are limited to 1960-2003 period, 






























policy was particularly procyclical across oil producing countries (Villafuerte and Lopez Murphy 
2010;  Villafuerte et al. 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that countries that are relatively more dependant on fiscal windfalls (e.g. 
oil, minerals) to finance public expenditures tend to lack the capacity to adapt public policy in 
the right direction: on average these countries show higher levels of fiscal procyclicality, which 
is harmful both at the aggregate level (inducing macro volatility) and in particular for the poor, 
who suffer the most from economic recessions. One key message of this paper is that how 
governments are financed, and in particular, how much taxes they collect, matters a lot for 
understanding variation in the ability of government’s to adapt public policy to changing 
economic conditions. 
This chapter provides the first reduced form empirical test of the theory presented in 
Chapter 1 linking the structure of public finance to spending patterns over the business cycle. 
Using different measures of fiscal windfalls, as well as two fiscal policy variables in a sample 
covering more than one hundred countries for over forty years, I exploit both cross-sectional and 
temporal variation in the data to show the connection between reliance on non-tax revenue 
sources and procyclical fiscal policy.  
These facts are hard to explain with standard theories of procyclicality. First of all, the 
data suggests that there is more to procyclical policy than simply a credit constraint argument: 
fiscal policy in developing is procyclical in recessions, as well as in booms. Secondly, 
institutional variables do not seem such robust predictors of policy behavior when paired with 





policy is hardly the outcome of purely economic events. The next chapter thus explores the 





Appendix 2.1: Measuring the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy 
  
Procyclicality of fiscal policy is a common concept in the economics literature with a standard 
methodology. Two ways of capturing the response of fiscal policy to the business cycle have 
been developed. I now show the logic of each measure. 
 
1. Correlation based measure 
The first step in this work consists of the definition of the cycle for an economic variable. The 
methodology consists of adjusting a tendency to the evolution of the logarithm of the variables 
under analysis (i.e., GDP, total government expenditures). To obtain the tendency of a time 
series, the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is frequently used, which consists of minimizing the 
variance of the variable of interest around its tendency. Calculating the difference between the 
original value of the variable's logarithm, and the logarithmic tendency estimated by the HP 
filter, the cyclical component is obtained. Finally, we calculate the correlation between the 
cyclical components of GDP and total government expenditures to establish the degree of 
procyclicality in each country. 
 
2. Regression based measure 
To obtain a measure of the cyclicality of fiscal policy, the following time series regression for 
each country i is estimated: 
 
The measure of procyclicality is the coefficient β where: OutputGap is defined as the log 
deviation of GDP from its HP trend, and TOTGap is a measure of the gap in terms of trade, 





GDP. The sign of β consistent with procyclical policy depends on the fiscal instrument or 
outcome of choice. When F is real government expenditures, a positive (negative) β coefficient 
indicates procyclicality (countercyclical policy). When F is the budget balance, a positive 
(negative) β coefficient indicates acyclical (procyclical fiscal policy). 
Finally, note the potential endogeneity problems involved in estimating the above 
equation. Implicitly, we are assuming, as does most of the literature, that the causality goes from 
the business cycle to fiscal policy. However, reverse causality issues (e.g. output reacts to fiscal 
policy) could in principle be driving the results (Braun 2001; Gali and Perotti 2003). Some recent 
papers suggest that this possibility is actually found in the data (Rigobon 2004; Jaimovich and 
Panizza 2007). According to this interpretation, most of the differences across countries are due 
to their exposure to different type of shocks, rather than to different policy reaction functions, as 
assumed by most of the literature. Yet, in a more exhaustive analysis, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) 
take again the reverse causality issue to the data, and show using a battery of econometric 
techniques (2SLS, GMM, VAR) and different GDP instruments, that output does cause 
expenditure changes in developing countries, providing support to the empirical strategy 
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Chapter 3. Fiscal windfalls and political budget cycles  
 
 
In the previous chapter, I analyze how public spending reacts to economic conditions. There I 
find that countries that are relatively more dependant on non-tax revenue sources (e.g. oil, 
minerals) to finance public expenditures show higher levels of fiscal procyclicality. However, 
not only economic but also political events are likely to induce variation in a country's policy 
pattern. Thus, this chapter studies the behavior of fiscal policy in the proximity of elections, 
trying to identify interactions with the revenue foundations of democratic governments.  
 Just as levels of procyclicality vary markedly by income groups, it is a well-known 
stylized fact that political budget cycles (e.g. election year increases in deficits and expenditures) 
are a common feature in the developing world (Schunknecht 2000; Brender and Drazen 2005; 
Shi and Svenson 2006). As shown in Figure 3.1, the size of the fiscal deficit in electoral years in 
larger on average in developing than in developed democracies. This chapter seeks to explore 
why is this is the case. 













A central empirical implication of the theory presented in Chapter 1 is that political 
budget cycles should be prevalent in rentier democracies, that is, political systems that are 
heavily reliant on fiscal windfalls. Thus, this chapter focuses on the role of non-tax revenue in 
generating electorally induced fluctuations in the budget in a sample of more than sixty 
democracies. In particular, it shows that the structure of public finance should be considered a 
key explanatory variable in accounting for politically motivated budget cycles in developing 
countries. This is in part a function of the fact that generating revenue from the resource sector is 
generally less costly for the government than extracting revenue from other sources, in 
particular, from the taxation of citizens. Such particular fiscal foundation alters the incentives of 
both politicians and voters around election times to manage expenditures and the budget balance. 
From the perspective of politicians, incumbents tend to enjoy a large share of the political 
benefit of spending but pay only a small fraction of the political cost of taxation. Most of the 
resources they spend on public goods originate from non-tax revenue sources. So we should 
expect these authorities to use low-cost spending power to try to remain in office. In order to 
understand the incentives of voters around elections, one needs to take into account the 
information structure of the electoral game. Building on the assumption that in low taxation 
environments the amount of budget information available to the public is limited, I argue that 
such information asymmetries leads voters to demand more of the goods they value, with 
elections being a key political moment to express those demands. As a result, politicians that 
increase expenditures or deficits in the vicinity of elections should not be punished at the polls.  
In contrast, governments that are relatively less reliant on these alternative resource bases 
should behave differently. In order to increase expenditures, politicians in these contexts need to 





fiscal profligacy should be punished out of office, providing incentives for them not to tinker 
with the budget around election times. Taxation then produces two effects: it raises the costs for 
politicians to engage in a spending binge, and secondly, provides voters with relatively more 
information about the extent of rent extraction on behalf of incumbents. In sum, there is an 
information gap characterizing electoral competition in rentier democracies, and this I argue is 
the mechanism that links dependence on non-tax revenue sources to political budget cycles in 
developing countries.  
To motive the argument, consider the case of Venezuela, a typical example of a rentier 
democracy in the literature (Karl 1997; Dunning 2008). While Venezuela is famous for its 
current history of fiscal profligacy, it is perhaps less well known that fiscal policy behavior 
before the oil booms was quite conservative. In fact, prior to the oil shock of the 1970s, 
Venezuela's fiscal policy was characterized by an informal rule: governments spent what they 
earned (Hausmann 1992). As shown by Figure 3.2, a period of low and stable oil prices was 
accompanied by alternation between small fiscal surpluses and deficits. After the oil shock of the 
early 70s (shaded region in the Figure), the country entered a new equilibrium of volatile and 
large fiscal deficits, leading to the accumulation of public debt (one of the highest in the region). 
In line with a paradox of plenty scenario, Venezuela's debt growth was sharpest between two oil 















Moreover, note that in terms of the political implications of this exogenous shock, election years 
became consistently associated with higher levels of fiscal deficits, something that was not 
common practice before the oil boom of 1974 (Kaplan 2008). To illustrate this difference, Figure 
3.3 plots the level of the primary fiscal balance during electoral years, both before and after the 
mid 70s oil shock. In this data, the “structural break” seems relatively easy to identify.  
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Table 3.1 presents more systematic evidence of such differences in policy outcomes. The Table 
shows results from a time series (1962-2006) model that follows the baseline equation estimated 
in standard political budget cycle studies:  
 
 
such that deft is the government’s primary budget balance as share of GDP at time t, ELECT is an 
election year dummy variable, and w a control variable, the growth rate of real GDP in year t. 
	  












As shown in the Table, the deficit increases by 2% of GDP on average during election years after 
the 1973/4 oil shock. Before that exogenous shock, no political budget cycle was evident in 
Venezuela. The goal of this chapter is to show that these two different behaviors observed over 




















The chapter is organized as follows. The next section surveys the literature on political 
budget cycles and highlights the chapters' contribution to this literature. Section 2 provides 
empirical evidence that political budget cycles are a systematic feature of rentier democracies, 
and Section 3 looks at the electoral returns of fiscal policy behavior in both rentier and non-
rentier democracies. Conclusions follow. 
 
3.1 Political Budget Cycles: related literature 
Political budget cycles (PBC) are changes in the level or some component of the government 
budget induced by the electoral calendar.39 More specifically, the term refers to increases in 
government spending or the deficit or decreases in taxes (including changes relative to long-term 
trends) in an election year which are perceived as motivated by the incumbent's desire for re-
election for himself or his party (Drazen 2008). A vast theoretical and empirical literature 
focuses on the relationship between elections and fiscal policy. Two particular issues have 
captured scholar’s attention:  the behavior of fiscal policy in the vicinity of elections, and the 
electoral returns of such strategies.  
At the theoretical level, political budget cycles may arise due to moral hazard (Besley and 
Case 1995) or adverse selection (Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Rogoff 1990; Persson and Tabellini 
2000) problems. In the former case, voters reward politicians who cut taxes or spend on goods 
that are valued by them, thus providing incentives for incumbents to tinker with the budget 
around election times. In the latter, voters try to select the most “competent” politicians through 
                                                
39 It is conceptually useful to distinguish such fiscal cycles from the more well known political business cycle, in 
which the outcome variable is economic activity (inflation, unemployment, growth). See Alesina et al (1997) and 





elections, but in the absence of a priori information about politician types, incumbents may use 
the budget to signal their competence levels to voters.40     
The empirical literature has explored a number of institutional conditions that make 
governments more likely to engage in budget manipulations in the vicinity of elections. For 
example, Persson and Tabellini (2002) find presidentialism to be associated with post-election 
fiscal adjustments (spending cuts, tax hikes and rises in surplus) and majoritarian electoral rules 
with pre-electoral spending cuts, while in proportional representation systems expansions of 
welfare spending occur both before and after elections. 
In addition, the more recent literature focuses on the role of information and varying 
levels of voter awareness about politician's behavior to explain PBC. Brender and Drazen (2005) 
find a political budget cycle in a large cross-section of countries, but this fact is driven by the 
experience of "new democracies" in the first few years after their transition to democratic 
regimes. The authors argue that in these settings, fiscal manipulation may work because voters 
are inexperienced with electoral politics or may simply lack the information needed to evaluate 
fiscal manipulation that is produced in more established democracies.  
Along similar lines, Shi and Svensson (2006) find that the size of political budget cycles 
is much larger in developing countries than in developed countries.41 To explain such variation, 
they focus on two factors: politicians' rents from remaining in power (proxied by level of 
corruption) and the share of informed voters in the electorate (proxied by level of media access). 
Higher levels of corruption and a small share of informed voters imply larger deficit increases in 
                                                
40 In this setup, a competent incumbent is one that can provide higher levels of public goods for a given budget 
constraint. 
 
41 In addition to the cross-national large N studies reviewed here, PBC have been documented in a number of case 
studies at the national level even for autocracies (Magaloni 2006 and Gonzalez 2002 on Mexico, Blaydes 2011 on 
Egypt). For subnational level evidence of PBC, see Akhmedov et al. (2004) in Russia, Meloni (2009) for Argentina, 





election years for developing countries. This evidence suggests that the ability of voters to 
monitor economic policy is a key determinant of fiscal outcomes. Lack of budget transparency 
provides incentives for opportunistic politicians to incur fiscal deficits and debt accumulation, as 
shown by recent studies on the OECD (Alt and Lassen 2006a;b) and across American States (Alt 
and Lassen 2006c). 
The logic of my argument draws from the recent emphasis on voter information and 
transparency by the literature. However, it departs from the extant scholarship in two main ways. 
First, I take into account a largely neglected aspect of the institutional environment: I will show 
that the revenue foundations of governments are a major determinant of incentives for politicians 
to manipulate fiscal policy around election time. Given the nature of the budget constraint they 
face, politicians in rentier democracies are more likely to use low cost spending power to remain 
in office, and thus more likely to incur in a PBC. Second, I do not take the level of information 
that is available to voters as exogenous but rather, derive it from the fiscal foundations of 
governments: non-tax or windfall revenue is intrinsically less transparent than other type of tax 
revenues, and thus more "stealable". Tax revenue is collected from citizens. Resource rents, on 
the other hand, flow directly into the public coffers, without any need for collection of private 
income from citizens. This information asymmetry makes rational (but uninformed) voters 
demand higher levels of public goods around election times and politicians ready to supply them 








Drawing on the electoral and fiscal datasets of Brender and Drazen (2005) and Persson and 
Tabellini (2003), the following empirical analysis is restricted to a sample of 68 democracies 
over the period 1960-2001: that is, only country-years that receive a score between 0 and 10 in 
the Polity IV database are considered. These countries may be classified as those that were in the 
OECD for the entire sample period, transition economies of Eastern Europe, and all other 
developing democracies. I combine this data with measures of rentierism used in the previous 
chapter. In particular, my proxy for rentierism is an indicator variable drawn from Morrison 
(2009), which takes the value 1 if the government has a ratio of non-tax revenue sources to 
expenditures that is greater than the mean in the sample, and takes the value zero otherwise (see 
Table A3.1 for country classification).42 
 
3.2.2 Empirical Strategy 
The basic regression to be estimated in this section is of the form: 
 
where f is an indicator of fiscal policy in country i in year t, Xit is a vector of control variables, 
ELECt is an electoral year dummy, and µi is a country fixed effect.43 The two main fiscal policy 
variables used as dependent variables are: 1) the fiscal balance (bal), defined as the difference 
between central government total revenue plus grants and total expenditures; and 2) total central 
                                                
42 Morrison (2009) non-tax revenue measure includes not only foreign aid and natural resource revenue attained 
through state-owned enterprises, but also borrowing- from abroad or the Central Bank-and all other revenue besides 
taxation, for example, other state-owned enterprise revenue, and so forth. 
 
43 Year effects were insignificant and therefore dropped from the analysis. 
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government expenditures (exp), both scaled as percentage of GDP. In addition to country fixed 
effects, economic control variables include real GDP per capita, the trade share, a demographic 
variable representing the fraction of the population aged 65+ and a measure of the output gap, as 
defined in the previous chapter.44 In presenting the results, I only report the coefficient of the 
electoral variable for brevity, indicating whether or not there is a statistically significant political 
cycle. Since the inclusion of country fixed effects in an equation with lagged dependent variable 
introduces a potential estimation bias, to address this problem I also present GMM estimates (the 
Arellano-Bond estimator). 
  
3.2.3 Baseline Results 
I start the analysis by estimating the equation above for different sub-samples of democracies. As 
shown by Table 3.2 (columns 2 and 8), pooling all democracies together provide evidence of an 
electoral cycle with respect to the fiscal balance: the deficit rises in an election year by about 
four tenths of one percent of GDP relative to non-election years. At the same time, no political 
cycle with respect to government expenditures is observed with this particular cut of the data. 
 
                                                






Table	  3.2:	  Political	  budget	  cycles	  across	  countries	  1960-­‐2001	  
 
 
However, by splitting the sample into rentier and non-rentier democracies, a different picture 
emerges: political budget cycles in the full sample of democracies are being driven by the 
experience of rentier democracies. Columns 5/11 and 6/12 show that election years are 
accompanied by both deficit and expenditure increases in these type of democracies, while no 
significant effects are found in countries that are more reliant on general taxation (columns 3/9 
and 4/10). The estimates of column 6 and 12 suggest that the fiscal deficit as a share of GDP is 
about one percentage point higher during election years. Given the average fiscal deficit in the 
sample (2.18% of GDP), the estimate implies that on average, fiscal deficit increases by 45% in 
electoral years in these types of countries. 
Figure 3.4 provides a graphical illustration of these results, by presenting the behavior of 
fiscal policy in the vicinity of elections for both rentier versus non-rentier democracies. The 
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Figure 3.4: Behavior of fiscal policy (deficit and spending) in the vicinity of elections  
 
The figure suggests a significant difference between the two sets of countries, with the 
deficit level and government spending growth in an election year being appreciably higher than 
in the prior and posterior years in rentier democracies (V shape patterns), while fiscal policy does 
not appear to be significantly different across years in non-rentier democracies. However, one 
could argue that the patterns described here are just another manifestation of the classical divide 
between developed and developing nations. As already indicated, until recently the political 
budget cycle was thought to be a phenomenon largely of less developed countries (Ames 1987; 
Schuknecht 2000). Thus, to the extent that rentier democracies are also preponderantly part of 
the developing world, this concern raises questions about the validity of my distinction.  
To tackle this issue, Table 3.3 considers developed and less developed countries 
separately. Note that in contrast to our previous exercise, using this traditional dichotomy does 





developing and developed countries seem equally likely to engage in political budget cycles (at 
least with respect to the fiscal balance).45  









However, as useful as the distinction introduced here is for generating broad generalizations 
about the differential impact of elections on fiscal policy, the method of sample splitting used so 
far makes it difficult to compare my argument to alternative explanations of PBCs in a 
systematic way. To overcome this limitation, the next section explores the interaction effects 
between the sources of government revenue and the electoral calendar on fiscal outcomes. 
 
3.2.4 Political Budget Cycles. Conditional effects 
This section re-estimates the baseline equation by pooling all countries together and introducing 
interaction terms between the election year dummy and whether the country is a: (a) rentier 
democracy (RENT), (b) new democracy (NEW), or (c) presidential (PRES). Table 3.4 presents 
these results. 
 
                                                
45 Although the cycle appears stronger in the former set of countries when the variable of interest is the fiscal deficit. 
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As shown by Table 3.4, the effects of rents on fiscal policy remain robust after conditioning on 
democratic experience and the form of government. This is especially true when the dependent 
variable is central government expenditures (columns 2 and 6) but less so in the case of the fiscal 
deficit (columns 4 and 8). Using the coefficients from Models 3 and 5, Figure 3.5 displays the 
marginal effect of elections on fiscal policy in rentier and non-rentier democracies, with 95% 
confidence intervals around these estimated effects. For both fiscal policy variables, the effect of 
elections is not statistically different from zero in non-rentier democracies, while it is robustly 
negative (positive) for the balance (expenditures) in rentier ones. Furthermore, in both cases the 
confidence intervals do not overlap, indicating that the effect of elections differs significantly 
between political systems with such diverse revenue foundations. 
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With respect to the controls, note that consistent with Brender and Drazen (2005) 
findings, new democracies are more likely to engage in electoral cycles with respect to the fiscal 
balance. The introduction of this control somewhat reduces the marginal effect of non-tax 
revenue on deficits (columns 4 and 8) but the effects on spending remain basically unaltered 
(columns 2 and 6). Finally, I do not find presidential systems to be more likely to engage in 
political budget cycles once we condition on the fiscal basis of governments. I now turn to 




































3.3 Who punishes fiscal deficits? 
The seminal contribution of Peltzman (1992) gave rise to an important question on whether 
voters reward (behaving as fiscal liberals) or punish (as fiscal conservatives) manipulation of 
fiscal policy around election times. In that paper, Peltzman found that voters in the United States 
are less likely to support governors who increase overall expenditures before elections. While the 
subsequent literature has tended to corroborate Pelztam’s findings at both the national (Alesina et 
al. 1998; Brender and Drazen 2008) and subnational levels (Brender 2003), the extant 
scholarship has so far ignored the country level variation induced by differences in revenue 
structures.46  Thus, this subsection explores the electoral returns of fiscal policy manipulations 
around election times for both rentier and non-rentier democracies. In particular, I study how 
fiscal expansions during election years affect the probability of reelection of either incumbent 
candidates or parties. According to my argument, voters should punish fiscal profligacy only in 
countries that don't rely on fiscal windfalls as a major source of spending. To test this hypothesis, 
I draw on Brender and Drazen's (2008) recent study of elections and fiscal policy in a sample of 
74 democracies over the period 1960-2003. The key dependent variable now is a binary variable 
with a value of one if the incumbent was reelected and zero otherwise. Two definitions of 
reelection are used: at the individual level, only observations where the leader is running for 
reelection are included; at the party level, observations in which a leader was substituted by 
another candidate from her party were added.47 
The key independent variable is as an indicator of fiscal year expansions, the change in 
the ratio of the central government's fiscal balance to GDP in the election year relative to the 
                                                
46 At the subnational level, one exception is Jones et al. (2012), who study the incentives for voters to reward 
spending increases in Argentine provinces. Such behavior is induced by federal fiscal arrangements (large vertical 
imbalances) and political gaming (discretionary transfers to partisan allies). 
47 This latter definition includes the possibility that the incumbent either died before the election or could not run 





previous year (BALCH_ey). To interpret results, note that the variable refers to changes in the 
surplus, so that a positive coefficient means that a higher surplus in election years increases the 
probability of reelection, or equivalently, a larger deficit reduces reelection prospects. I include 
two macroeconomic controls: the average growth rate of real per capita income during the 
leader's current term (GDPPC_gr) and the average annual rate of inflation during the leader's 
current term (INF). Finally, additional controls include dummies for whether countries are 
developed (dev) or new democracies (new). 
Table 3.5 shows the effects of the fiscal balance, economic growth and inflation on the 





Table	  3.5:	  The	  effects	  of	  the	  budget	  balance	  on	  probability	  of	  reelection	  
 
 
In columns 1 and 4 the unconditional effects are shown in the individual and party samples, 
respectively. Looking separately at the effects of the fiscal balance on rentier and non-rentier 
democracies, I find that rising deficits in the election year lower the probability of reelection in 
non-rentier democracies (columns 2 and 5). In contrast, columns 3 and 6 show no significant 
effect of fiscal expansions on electoral behavior for rentier democracies. These findings suggest 
that even when voters in rentier countries do not reward fiscal expansions, they may be more 
tolerant of fiscal profligacy during election years, relative to voters in taxation environments. 
As shown by Figure 3.6, the probability of reelection rises monotonically with positive 
changes in the fiscal balance for non-rentier democracies. In other words, voters in tax 
democracies are fiscal conservatives: they punish incumbent candidates or parties who engage in 
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budget manipulations at the polls, a result that is consistent with the lack of a PBC in such 
contexts. 
 













The results from this chapter demonstrate variation in budget outcomes according to the electoral 
calendar only in rentier democracies. Once we condition on the revenue structure of 
governments, PBCs are prevalent only on those democracies where windfalls make up a large 
share of the budget. In line with the expectations of the theory presented in Chapter 1, politicians 
in rentier democracies are more likely to engage in PBCs: the fiscal balance deteriorates and 
public expenditures significantly increase during election years. At the same time, voters in 
windfall contexts seem more tolerant of this behavior than their counterparts in taxation 





manipulations in fiscal policy. So far, existing analyses have overlooked the revenue foundations 
of governments as a determinant of incentives for engaging in PBCs. The traditional divide 
between developed and developing countries is not as useful as the one proposed here to account 
for policy variation, given that both developed and developing countries show evidence of PBCs 
taking place. Thus, this chapter advances the literature on the PBC by providing a new 
mechanism impacting fiscal policy behavior during elections. Resource rents provide politicians 
with low cost spending power. At the same time, non-tax revenue dependence poses serious 
information challenges to voters that make them more likely to demand higher levels of public 
expenditures. Election times are the moment where these demands are made salient, and where 
the incentives of politicians and voters meet to generate a PBC. 
Yet, so far in the discussion I have only assumed that lower levels of voter information 
characterize windfall democracies. What are the empirical counterparts of this abstract 
information concept? Is the low taxation-low information assumption plausible? The next two 






Table	  A3.1:	  Countries	  in	  the	  sample	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Table	  A3.2:	  Variables,	  definitions,	  and	  sources	  
 
Variables Definition Sources 
Fiscal policy 
Balance (bal) The difference between Total Revenue & 
Grants and Total Expenditure (% of GDP 
Brender and Drazen (2005) 
Expenditure (exp) Total Central Government Expenditure (% of 
GPD) 
Brender and Drazen (2005) 
Balance change election year 
(BALCH_ey) 
The change in the ratio of the central 
government’s fiscal balance to GDP in the 
election year relative to the previous year 
Brender and Drazen (2008) 
Election variables 
Elect Dummy variable that receives the value 1 in 
the election year and 0 otherwise 
Brender and Drazen (2005) 
Economic controls 
Trade The share of international trade, as a 
percentage of GDP 
Brender and Drazen (2005) 
Lgdp_pc The log of real per-capita income Brender and Drazen (2005) 
Pop65+ The fraction of a country's 
population between and 65 and above 
Brender and Drazen (2005) 
Gdp_hp  A measure of the output gap, calculated as the 
difference between real GDP and its 
(country specific) trend. The trend was 
computed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter on 
the 
change in real GDP. 
Brender and Drazen (2005) 
GDPPC_gr The average growth rate of real per capita 
income during the leader’s current term 
Brender and Drazen (2008) 
INF The average annual rate of inflation during the 
leader’s current term 
Brender and Drazen (2008) 
Institutional controls 
PRES Receives the value of 1 and Presidential 
system, and 0 otherwise 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) 
NEW New democracies are those that began having 
competitive elections within the sample period 
(1960-2001). The first four elections 
correspond to observations coming from new 
democracies 










In the past few years, transparency in government activities has received considerable attention 
in both academic and policy circles. Defined in general as the ability of voters to observe 
incumbent behavior or receive information about government activities, transparency is “fast 
becoming the motherhood and apple pie of good governance” (Besley 2006, p. 203). For 
example, in theoretical models of electoral accountability, improved information forces 
incumbent governments to act in the best interest of voters (Ferejohn 1986; Persson and Tabelini 
2000).48 In more applied research, lack of voter information is treated as a “political market 
imperfection” and thus an important source of distortion in political incentives to provide high 
quality public services, in particular to the most vulnerable groups (Keefer and Khemani 2005).49   
The interest in (the lack of) transparency of government activities goes far beyond 
academic circles. The IMF regards “lack of transparency” as a feature of the buildup to the 
financial crises in Mexico (1994-1995) and Asia (1997-1998) and more recently, inadequacies in 
Greece’s budget system have contributed to its debt crisis. Prompted by these concerns, 
international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank have developed a range 
of standards of “best practices” covering various economic policy areas that are now 
                                                
48 Information need not be always desirable for voters. Prat (2005) introduces a distinction between information on 
the consequences of the agent’s actions and information directly on the agent’s action. In a career concerns model, 
he shows that while the former is always beneficial for the principal, the latter need not. See also Besley and Smart 
(2007). 
 
49 Reinika and Svensson (2003) use a policy experiment in Uganda to illustrate how increased voter access to 
information can reduce misallocation of public expenditures. See Olken (2007) on the relationship between top-





internationally recognized and applied by member countries. Among these policy areas, the 
promotion of fiscal transparency in the budget process has occupied a predominant role in the 
quest of fostering good governance. A transparent budget process that provides the public with 
all relevant revenue and expenditure information in a reliable, timely, understandable, and 
internationally comparable manner, is regarded as key for ensuring that public officials are held 
accountable for managing public resources. In particular, there is a consensus that fiscal 
transparency is essential for informed economic decision-making (Gavazza and Lizzeri 2009), 
and an important precondition for maintaining fiscal discipline (Kopits and Craig 1998). 
Moreover, given the concerns of this project, it is useful to point out that recent studies suggest a 
relationship between the quality of budget institutions (with transparency being a key 
component) and spending patterns over the business cycle: high quality institutions (e.g. a more 
transparent budget process) provide better scope for conducting countercyclical policies (Dabla 
Norris et al. 2010). 
Despite the attention that fiscal transparency has received in the last decade, empirical 
studies on its determinants are still quite limited (Alt et al. 2006; Andreula et al. 2009). The lack 
of attention to endogeneity issues in this area is even more striking when faced with the simple 
notion that incumbents often do not have incentives to produce the most transparent budget 
procedures, since doing so decreases their informational advantage over voters and fellow 
politicians—an advantage useful for re-election purposes. For example, by strategically 
manipulating information, incumbents can appear as fiscally restrained even when they are 
fiscally undisciplined for opportunistic reasons (Alesina and Perotti 1996).50 
                                                
50 Among the list of “tricks”, one can include the strategic manipulation of revenue and spending forecasts, a 
common practice in developing countries in general (Danninger et al. 2005) and Latin America in particular 






Given the fact that fiscal transparency does not always come about by itself, the goal of 
this chapter is to explore under what conditions is transparency more likely to play out in the 
fiscal process. In particular, I seek to test the key assumption of the theory presented in chapter 
1: that the structure of public finance (where revenue comes from) affects the flow of 
information citizen’s receives about budgets.  In particular, I study whether reliance on fiscal 
windfalls makes it harder for voters to ‘pierce the veil’ of budgetary accounts and infer the true 
fiscal stance of the government. The main hypothesis is that levels of fiscal transparency should 
be affected by the source of government revenues. Based on a cross-sectional analysis 
encompassing 117 countries, I find empirical support for the proposition that countries that rely 
on windfall revenue to finance public expenditures tend to have lower levels of fiscal 
transparency, after controlling for a number of important economic and political fundamentals.  
The main contribution of this chapter is to show the conditions under which fiscal 
transparency is more likely to occur. While the few previous studies on the subject have focused 
on institutional or political origins, I add to the list of potential determinants of fiscal 
transparency the structure of public finance: that is, where does public revenue come from? In 
previous chapters, I have argued that taxes and windfalls have different implications in terms of 
information availability. Given that windfall revenue flows directly to government coffers, 
without any need for collection of private income from citizens, the latter do not have a precise 
estimate of how much revenue the government has. At the same time, this technology of 
collection conspires against the dissemination of information on behalf of politicians who, given 
opportunistic and rent seeking incentives, have an interest in keeping the veil of the budget 





The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.1 presents a basic definition of fiscal 
transparency and its empirical counterparts. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the literature on 
the consequences, and a less developed scholarship on the causes, of fiscal transparency. Section 
4.3 is the core of the chapter and presents results from a cross-sectional analysis of the 
relationship between fiscal windfalls and transparency in more than 100 countries. The 
conclusion discusses the contribution of this chapter in the context of the broader dissertation 
project. 
 
4.1 Fiscal transparency: definition, examples, and empirical counterparts 
According to a standard definition in the literature, fiscal transparency is “openness toward the 
public at large about government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector 
accounts, and projections. It involves ready access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, 
understandable, and internationally comparable information on government activities so that the 
electorate and financial markets can accurately assess the government’s financial position and 
the true costs and benefits of government activities, including their present and future economic 
and social implications.” (Kopits and Craig 1998, p. 1) 
To make this definition palatable, it is useful to look at examples of transparent and non-
transparent practices, both in theory and in practice. A transparent budget process is one that 
provides clear information on all aspects of government fiscal policy, that are easily available to 
the public and to participants in the policymaking process, and that do present consolidated 
information, are transparent (Poterba and von Hagen, 1999, pp. 3–4). On the contrary, budgets 
that include numerous special accounts and that fail to consolidate all fiscal activity into a single 





characterized by two common practices: a) hidden budgeting, a situation where the real budget is 
known only to a selected few, thus facilitating the misappropriation of funds and increasing the 
scope for mis-governance, and b) enclave budgeting, whereby certain spending programs and 
projects are protected by the establishment of special funds outside the purview of the annual 
budget and public scrutiny (Schick 1998). 
An example of the latter is the National Development Fund (FONDEN), an off-budget 
fund that finance development projects and is controlled by the President in Venezuela with high 
levels of discretion. The fund resources come from two main sources: a) the oil windfall 
contribution paid by PDVSA, the national oil company51; and b) from the central bank’s 
international reserves, when they exceed a certain legally set level considered ‘sufficient’.52 In 
addition, a second off-budget mechanism that has been increasingly used by the current 
administration is to make PDVSA directly spend on social and infrastructure programs, such as 
food production and subsidized food distribution, investments in electricity, transportation, 
infrastructure and housing, and social and educational programs. During the recent oil boom 
(2003-2008), total off-budget expenditures, including FONDEN and direct social expenditures, 
amounted to the very significant total of US$66.2 billion (Manzano et al. 2011). Only in 2008, 
just before the drop in international oil prices, FONDEN accumulated resources amounting to 
US$14 billion, a figure equivalent to 15% of the national budget approved by the legislature in 
December 2007.53 
                                                
51 The windfall special contribution operates as a surcharge royalty of 50 per cent for revenues above a price of 
US$70 per barrel, which rises to 60 per cent if the price goes above US$100. 
 
52 The methodology for the determination of the “optimal” level of international reserves is not public information, it 
is only known by the members of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank. 
 
53 One could argue that the budget approved by the legislature is usually not the right metric of comparison since the 
Executive strategically under-estimates revenues at the preparation stage of the budget in order to execute a greater 





 The contemporaneous case of Venezuela is neither an exception in terms of budget 
practices around the world nor an anomaly when placed against the backdrop of Venezuela’s 
fiscal history.54 It is well understood that countries that derive a significant share of revenues 
from natural resources (e.g. oil) or aid face a unique set of transparency problems, arising from 
the technical complexity and volatility of resource revenue flows, as well as from the sheer 
magnitude of such transactions (IMF 2010). Similarly, flows of donor aid are often not fully 
integrated with the budget (Gupta et al. 2008). In such contexts, I argue that it is easier for less-
than-benevolent politicians to divert part of the fiscal windfall for private uses, given the 
informational rents generated by the collection technology. 
However, in order to place the Venezuela example in comparative perspective, one needs 
aggregate indicators that assess among other things, whether budget documents are 
“comprehensive” (does the annual budget approved by the legislature include all government 
expenditures?) and whether they cover extra-budgetary funds and activities or not. 
Internationally comparable indexes of fiscal transparency do just that. In recent years, several 
indexes have been developed by academics, financial institutions, and NGO’s to assess the 
degree of transparency of the budget process from a comparative perspective (Andreula et al. 
2009; Hammed 2005; IBP 2010). All of them build from benchmarks developed by either the 
IMF or OECD in their respective codes of good practices on fiscal transparency.55 Data is 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
54 In the middle of the oil boom in the 1970s, the government of Carlos Andres Perez created the Venezuelan 
Investment Fund (FIV), to which significant off-budget resources were channeled (Manzano et al. 2011). 
 
55 See the IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency and the accompanying Manual of Fiscal 
Transparency that explain the various dimensions against which transparency may be measured. See also OECD’s 






compiled from questionnaires or reports56 that evaluate actual budget procedures against these 
standards in order to construct an internationally comparable measure of fiscal transparency. In 
the empirical analysis that follows in section 4, I rely in part on the 2010 fiscal transparency 
index developed by the International Budget Partnership (IBP) through its Open Budget Survey. 
This index is not only the most recent one available but it’s also the most comprehensive in 
terms of coverage (n=94) including a diverse sample over a range of geographic locations, 
development stages, and political institutions.57 The questionnaire in the Open Budget Survey 
inquires about the public availability, timeliness, and comprehensiveness of a country’s budget 
reports during the different phases of the budget making process (preparation, approval, 
execution, control). However, before delving into the empirical analysis and use of the index, it 
is useful to briefly review findings from the extant scholarship on fiscal transparency in order to 
place this chapter’s contribution in context.  
 
4.2 Related literature 
The study of fiscal transparency is rooted in a well-established body of theoretical and 
empirical research on the institutional determinants of fiscal outcomes (Alesina and Perotti 1995; 
Poterba and von Hagen 1999). At the theoretical level, fiscal transparency (or the lack thereof) is 
modeled in the context of the agency problem: that is, information asymmetries between the 
government and voters or within the government hierarchy, which can influence the size and 
allocation of public resources (Besley 2006; Besley and Smart 2007; Gavazza and Lizzeri 2009; 
Shi and Svensson 2006). At the empirical level, fiscal transparency is a key component in 
                                                
56 See for example the IMF’s Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) 
http://www.imf.org/external/NP/rosc/rosc.aspx 
57 Other indexes in the literature are either regionally focused (Alt and Lasssen 2006 on OECD, Alesina et al 1999 






broader indexes relating the overall quality of budget institutions to fiscal discipline: budget 
deficits and public debt are significantly lower in countries that posses “hierarchical”  (top-
down) procedures that impose a hard budget constraint and a greater level of budgetary 
transparency (Alesina et al. 1999; von Hagen and Harden 1994). 
More recent studies suggest specific channels linking transparency to fiscal performance. 
Milesi-Ferreti (2003) explore the relationship between transparency and the effectiveness of 
numerical fiscal rules, that is, laws which establish ex ante constraints on deficits such as those 
imposed by members of the European Union under the Maastricht Treaty of the 1990s. In his 
model, fiscal transparency affects politicians’ responses to fiscal rules: under high transparency, 
rules induce politicians to make the real fiscal adjustments needed to bring the budget into 
balance, while under low transparency such rules simply encourage “creative accounting.” 
In the political agency models of Shi and Svensson (2006) and Alt and Lassen (2006a; 
2006b), voters want more “competent” politicians in office, however this creates incentives for 
incumbent to try to appear competent by issuing debt, even when they are not. Transparency 
determines the extent to which voters can observe debt before deciding whether to reelect the 
incumbent or not, and thus, the scope for engaging in opportunistic electoral cycles. Using a 
sample of 19 OECD countries during the 1990s, Alt and Lassen find that electoral cycles in 
fiscal policy are prevalent in lower transparency countries (Alt and Lassen 2006a) and that 
deficits and debt are lower the higher the level of fiscal transparency (Alt and Lassen 2006b).  
Alt et al. (2002) build on Ferejohn’s (1999) political agency framework to study the 
impact of fiscal transparency on the size of government in the American states. Ferejohn (1999) 
presents a principal-agent model of retrospective voting in which political agents can choose to 





resources and support. The key result is that there are circumstances in which more transparency 
can make the agent (and the principal) better off. The intuition of the model is that there are 
equilibria in which more transparency produces lower uncertainty about the sort of actions taken 
by a political incumbent, thus more voter confidence in the incumbent (or in voters' ability to 
distinguish good performance from bad performance), and as a result, higher investment in the 
agency relationship, that is, principals entrusting greater resources to politicians. Using cross-
section data for 1986-1995 for the American states, Alt et al. (2002) find support for some of 
these propositions, as their subnational index of fiscal transparency is positively correlated with 
total government expenditures and gubernatorial popularity. 
Finally, several recent papers explore the direct relationship between transparency and 
fiscal outcomes using relatively large N samples. For instance, Hameed (2005) develops an 
index of fiscal transparency based on IMF reports on the adherence to the Code of Good 
Practices on Fiscal Transparency and shows that, for a broad range of countries, higher 
transparency is associated with more fiscal discipline (lower deficits), better credit ratings, and 
lower levels corruption. Jarmuzek (2006) assesses the role of fiscal transparency in establishing 
better fiscal discipline in sample of 27 transition economies: he finds a negative, although weak, 
relationship between fiscal transparency and debt accumulation. 
While there exists a fairly large literature on the effects of fiscal transparency, very little 
work considers the endogeneity of such institutions. Two recent exceptions are Alt et al. (2006) 
and Andreula et al. (2009). In the first, the question motivating the analysis is the same as in this 
chapter: under what circumstances will politicians implement more transparent budget 
procedures? Based on an original index of budget practices in the American states from 1972 to 





aimed at improving fiscal transparency. The logic presented is simple: when two parties compete 
for office and the risk of replacement is sufficiently large, the incumbent may choose to increase 
transparency (and therefore lose the informational advantages afforded by a low transparency 
regime) and tie its own hands, but also those of her potential successor. Additionally, the authors 
find that polarization works in the opposite direction as political competition: polarization is 
associated with lower transparency, which could suggest that bipartisan cooperation on 
increasing transparency is only possible when parties are not too distant from each other. In the 
empirical analysis that follows, I build on this literature mostly to control for the political 
determinants of fiscal transparency. 
 
4.3 Empirical analysis 
Data. The sample is restricted by the availability of fiscal transparency data. As noted in section 
2, I draw on the 2010 fiscal transparency index developed by the International Budget 
Partnership (IBP) through its Open Budget Survey to measure the dependent variable. The 
questionnaire in the Open Budget Survey inquires about the public availability, timeliness, and 
comprehensiveness of a country’s budget reports during the different phases of the budget 
making process (preparation, approval, execution, control). It is available for 94 countries and 
spans a diverse sample including variation in political institutions, five geographic regions, and 
all stages of economic development. 
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of transparency scores in the full sample, countries 
marked in red are the ones considered by the IMF hydrocarbon-rich countries between 2000 and 
2005 and satisfy the following criteria: (i) an average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral fiscal 





mineral export proceeds in total export proceeds of at least 25% (IMF 2007). Countries are 
ranked by their level of transparency (0-100 index) along with categories developed by IBP on 
how much information is reported through the different stage of the budget process: extensive 
(81-100), some (61-80), minimal (21-40), scant (0-20).  












While there is one resource riche country (Norway) that provides “extensive” budget 
information, most of the countries characterized by natural resource wealth tend to scatter toward 
the lower part of the graph and on average, report between “minimal” or “scant” levels of 
information. For example, among the ten countries with the lowest transparency scores in the 
sample, seven are rich in hydrocarbons.  In the analysis that follows, I study whether this 
negative relationship between fiscal windfalls and transparency is robust to a number of 

























































Measuring fiscal windfalls. The key independent variable in this chapter is government’s access 
to fiscal windfalls. To proxy for this concept, I use two measures: a) the share of fuel exports in 
total merchandise exports (FUELX) between 1990 and 2009, drawing on the World 
Development Indicators, and b) a dummy variable indicating whether the country’s average 
share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral fiscal revenues in total fiscal revenue is at least 25 percent 
between 2000 and 2005 (FISCALW), drawing on the IMF’s Guide on Resource Revenue 
Transparency. As shown by Table A4.1 (Appendix), there is considerable variation in the extent 
to which countries have access to these resources.  
  
Controls. Based on previous analysis on the determinants of fiscal transparency (Alt et al. 2006c; 
Andreula et al. 2009), the baseline specifications include the following controls (see Table A4.1 
for summary of variables of data sources). All the explanatory variables are expressed as an 
average for the period 1990-2009 (for available years): 
- GDP per capita, in log (LYP). Richer countries can afford better informational systems, and 
they might have greater incentives to publicize their fiscal results. 
- Two demographic variables most likely to affect electorate’s overall awareness to information: 
percentage of population living in urban areas, URBAN, and the percentage of people aged 
between 14 and 65, AGE. 
- To control for geography, I use four dummy variables for continental location. They refer to 
countries in Africa (AFRICA), eastern and southern Asia (ASIAE), Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LATAM), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the OECD (the default group 





- Quality of institutions. Scholars usually draw on the governance indicators developed by the 
World Bank to measure institutional quality contemporaneously.58 Combining both large opinion 
surveys and measures based on polls of experts, governance is proxied by clusters of variables 
such as voice and accountability (Voice&Account), government effectiveness (GovEff), rule of 
law (RuLaw) and control of corruption (ContrCorrupt). The problem with using these variables 
in the current context is that such measures are often endogenous to more structural determinants 
that appear on the right hand side of the specifications. As shown by Table A4.2 (Appendix), 
with the exception of one indicator, the rest of the governance indicators are significantly 
negatively affected by the windfall variables.  
To remedy this problem, I rely on deeper determinants of institutional quality in the 
analysis: legal origins (La Porta et al. 1998) and levels of settler mortality (Acemoglu et al. 
2001). La Porta et al. (1998) use legal system origins to estimate the quality of institutions, by 
classifying each country in one out of five categories according to its commercial legal tradition: 
common law (LO_uk), German civil law (LO_ge), Scandinavian law (LO_sc), socialist law 
(LO_so), and French civil law, the omitted category in this analysis. The settler mortality figures 
are entered in logs (log SM). 
- Democracy. Based on the polity2 scores (POLITY), I control for the effects that the regime 
type may exert on government incentives to provide fiscal information and the fact that 
democracies tend to be more transparent than non-democracies (Hollyer et al. 2011). 
- Political competition and polarization. Drawing on the 2010 Database of Political 
Institutions, I use two proxies of political competition: the fraction of seats held by the 
government party in the legislature (GOVSEATS) and a measure of fractionalization capturing 
the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of 
                                                





different parties (GOVFRAC). As a measure political polarization, we rely on the policy 
distance, or the maximum difference between the chief executive’s party’s position and the 
values of the three largest government parties and the largest opposition party (POLAR). 
 
Results. Table 4.1 presents results from simple OLS estimations with the fuel export variable as 
proxy for windfall revenue. Column 1 is the baseline regression including only economic 
determinants of transparency, Columns 2 and 3 introduce historical determinants of institutional 





























Consistent with the working assumption developed in chapter 1, budget processes in countries 
with higher shares of fuel exports as a share of total merchandise exports tend to be significantly 
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less transparent. Depending on the specification, a 10% increase in the share of fuel exports is 
associated with 1.5-3 point reduction in levels of fiscal transparency on average. With respect to 
the controls, it is worth noting that in line with previous studies, I find that political competition, 
institutional quality (legal origins), and levels of democracy (polity scores) are significant 
determinants of fiscal transparency (Alt et al 2006c; Andreula et al. 2009; Hollyer et al. 2011). 
Figure 4.2 shows the negative partial correlation between fuel exports and fiscal transparency 
after controlling for levels of economic development, geographic location and legal origins.  
 











Table 4.2 replicates the exercise from the previous Table using a more direct proxy of 
fiscal windfalls: the indicator variable telling whether the country’s average share of 
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The results are consistent with previous findings: levels of fiscal transparency are on average 
between 9 and 19 percentage points lower in countries where windfall revenue explains a 
significant part of total fiscal resources. The economic significance of windfalls is only matched 
by the Scandinavian legal origins variable, and to a lesser extent, a Common law tradition. 
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Robustness checks. While previous exercises control for the level of democracy, one could argue 
the approach of pooling democratic and non-democratic regimes in the sample may obscure as 
much as it clarifies the argument in the sense that the results we observe could be driven by the 
presence of non-democratic regimes who are almost by definition non-transparent. As shown by 
Figure 4.3, however, the sample used so far is not particularly biased against democracy, when 
measured using polity scores for the period under analysis.  
 











Moreover, the regressions in Tables 4.3 restrict the sample to countries with strictly 
positive polity2 scores (Columns 1-3), and to “strong” democracies, that is, countries whose 















by introducing a dummy variable for presidential regimes.59 The introduction of this variable is 
theoretically justified by the logic of separation of powers under presidential regimes: when 
decision-making authority over spending and taxation is assigned to different government bodies 
(e.g. checks and balances), voters should in principle be able to discipline politicians and push 
down the level of rent extraction (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997; 2000). The implication of 
this argument in the current setup is that presidential systems should have, ceteris paribus, more 
transparent budget procedures.  Even after controlling for this type of formal political institution, 
the results show that variation in fiscal windfalls can explain levels of transparency across 














                                                
59 A country is coded as presidential if the confidence requirement is not necessary for the executive to stay in 
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Are these results specific to the transparency index of choice? To answer this question, I 
draw on Andreula et al. (2009) measure of fiscal transparency, which after the IBP index used so 
far, has the largest country coverage (n=82). This index is constructed by translating into 
numerical values the qualitative information presented in 82 countries’ Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), issued by the IMF along three dimensions: 1) 
clarity and assurances of information, roles and responsibility; 2) open budget preparation, and 
3) public availability of information.60  
The first dimension evaluates how each country adheres to the following principles: “the 
government sector should be distinguished from the rest of the public sector; there should be an 
open legal, regulatory and administrative framework for fiscal management; fiscal data should 
meet accepted data quality standards; fiscal activities should be subject to effective internal 
oversight and safeguards; fiscal information should be externally scrutinized.” (IMF 2007). The 
second dimension is a proxy that measures how clear national procedures are for budget 
execution, monitoring and reporting, as well as rating how much budget preparation follows an 
established timetable and is guided by well-defined macroeconomic and fiscal policy objectives. 
Lastly, the third dimension evaluates the extent to which in every country the public is provided 
with comprehensive information on past, current and projected fiscal activity and on all major 
risk, and if a commitment is made to timely publications (Andreula et al. 2009). 
As shown in Figure 4.4, there is a fair amount of correspondence between the two 
measures of fiscal transparency: the pairwise correlation in the 58 countries for which both 
indicators are available is .71. Moreover, notice that none of the hydrocarbon-rich countries (oil 
exporters in the figure) for which data is available appear in the upper right hand quadrant of the 
figure, that is, the cluster of the relatively more transparent systems.  
                                                
















Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present results from regressing the Andreula et al. index on our main variables 
of interest: fuel exports and fiscal dependence, respectively. Depending on the specification, 
Table 4 shows that a 10% increase in fuel exports as a share of total exports can produce up to a 
2.3-point reduction in the fiscal transparency (a variable ranging from 0 to 10), and according to 
Table 5, the budget processes in countries characterized by fiscal dependence on natural 
resources tend to score around 10 points lower than other types of countries in terms of 
transparency.  With respect to the political controls, some of the variables like levels of 
democracy and political competition, which in the IBP sample were found to be robust 
determinants of transparency, have less explanatory power in this context.  In sum, both Tables 
confirm that the relationship between fiscal windfalls and transparency is not an artifact of the 
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Finally, drawing on Dunning (2008), I instrument the two fiscal windfalls proxies with his oil 
rents per capita variable (RENTS) defined in chapter 2. Table 4.6 shows results. 
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In the Table, Columns 2 and 4 restrict the sample to political systems with strictly 
positive polity scores between 1990 and 2008 on average. Results from these 2SLS regressions 
are substantially larger than the OLS estimates. For example, across the sample of democracies, 
countries considered highly dependent on fiscal windfalls tend to score on average 25 points less 
than their non-dependent counterparts on the fiscal transparency index. In sum, the negative 
relationship found between windfalls and transparency is robust to a number of robustness 
checks: it is present across democracies, it is not an artifact of the particular index of choice 
measuring the dependent variable, and finally, is stronger when an instrumental variable 
approach is called for.    
 
Conclusion 
 In previous empirical chapters, I have shown that countries dependent on fiscal windfalls 
are more procyclical in their public spending (chapter 2), and tend to engage in political budget 
cycles (chapter 3). Both findings can be embedded in a political agency framework of elections 
that assumes the structure of public finance (where revenue comes from?) generates 
informational rents to incumbents (chapter 1). The present chapter has put to an empirical test the 
plausibility of this assumption, by exploring the relationship between fiscal windfalls and 
transparency in a cross-national context.  
Using two cross-sectional indexes of fiscal transparency covering 107 different countries, 
this chapter has shown that the combination of transparency and fiscal windfalls is a difficult 
one: budget processes in democracies highly dependent on non-tax revenue sources are 
substantially less transparent than democracies with a different budget constraint, a finding that 





about the relative lack of information that voters posses in windfall contexts about government’s 
fiscal activities and the process behind their taxing and spending decisions.  
While suggestive, the evidence presented in this chapter only exploits cross-sectional 
variation in the data. Ideally, we would like to explore how transparency changes over time as 
governments become more dependent on fiscal windfalls. Given data limitations, this type of 
research design is difficult to implement in a cross-national context, where panel data on fiscal 
transparency is still lacking. However, one could exploit inter-temporal change in other contexts. 
Thus, the next chapter explores the relationship between windfalls and transparency by studying 
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The coastal municipality of Campos dos Goytacazes is located in the north of Rio de Janeiro 
state. In the peak of the last oil boom, it received R$ 1343 million (US$ 803 million) in the form 
of royalty payments, or 24 percent of total oil rents distributed to all local governments during 
2008. The municipality of Sao Francisco de Itapobena, Campos’ neighboring and also coastal 
local government, received the equivalent of R$ 6.8 million (US$ 4 million) in royalty payments, 
or 0.12% percent of total oil rents in the same year. Why such disparity in benefits despite the 
geographic contiguity?  
While various rules comprise the allocation of royalty payments among the different 
levels of government in Brazil, the bulk of such of type of fiscal windfall is distributed across 
municipalities according to a geographic criterion: a local government is entitled to royalty 
payments if its coast happens to confront an oil well located kilometers away in the ocean, 
according to orthogonal and parallel projections. Thanks to the shape of its coast, Campos 
confronts the lion share of the country’s most productive off-shore oil fields, but Sao Francisco’s 
coast does not, resulting in the fact that the latter municipality receives 200 times less royalty 
revenue than the former. 
 In addition to being one of the single largest recipients of windfall wealth, the 
municipality of Campos is also (in)famous for the way it manages its public accounts. Public 
finance in Campos are characterized by a general mark of opacity: Since 2001, the municipality 





under the current Fiscal Responsibility Law (2000), in only four years. In contrast, its neighbor 
Sao Francisco, has sent its fiscal information to the central government every year.  
This chapter will show that this type of story can go beyond a tale of two cities. Based on 
a sample of more than 5000 municipalities observed between 2000 and 2009, this chapter first 
explores the connection between oil wealth and fiscal transparency at the subnational level in 
Brazil and shows that oil benefited municipalities have a higher probability of not disclosing 
their public finance, a finding that is consistent and complementary to the cross-national 
evidence linking oil dependence with low levels of fiscal transparency of the previous chapter.  
Based on available fiscal information, this chapter then explores how elections and 
windfall wealth interact to affect the levels and composition of local government expenditures. 
Previous research shows that while oil production is followed by significant increases in 
municipal revenues and spending levels across oil benefited municipalities, such fiscal 
expansions have not been in general accompanied by corresponding improvements in local 
public good outcomes (Caselli and Michael 2009; Ferraz and Monteiro 2010). For example, in 
2010, the last year for which public finance data is available, a recent annual report shows that 
among the top 20 municipalities ranked in terms of legislative expenses per capita, four were 
royalty recipients.61 This figure jumps to nine when considering personnel spending and 
administrative costs per capita. However, no royalty recipient municipality is included among the 
top 20 local governments with higher education expenses per student, suggesting that a large 
fraction of total spending funded by windfall wealth is not being devoted to genuinely useful 
public projects. 62 
                                                
61 Multi Cidades 2011-Financas dos Municipios do Brazil. Available at www.aequus.com.br/anuarios_brasil.html 
 
62 In fact, the common picture is one in which oil rich municipalities are frequently involved in corruption scandals, 





This chapter complements this previous work by studying in detail the behavior of fiscal 
policy in oil-benefited municipalities in the vicinity of elections. It not only finds that the size of 
the political budget cycle is larger among local governments entitled to important amounts of 
royalty payments, but also uncovers its nature by looking at how incumbents manipulate the 
composition of the budget in electoral years. Finally, this chapter explores the electoral returns of 
additional government spending and asks whether local voters reward incumbent mayors (or 
their co-partisans) who engage in election year spending binges. The results show that incumbent 
mayors who increase public spending in election years boost their party vote share, and their 
probability of reelection goes up as a function of this increase.   
 In analyzing the impact of windfall revenue on local public finance, this chapter speaks to 
a recent literature on the political and economic effects of different government revenue sources 
(e.g., taxes, transfers, royalty payments) at the municipal level in Brazil. Some studies focus on 
the role of intergovernmental transfers in shaping: i) candidate quality and the incidence of 
corruption (Brollo et al. 2010); and ii) public spending levels and electoral outcomes (Litschig 
and Morrison 2010). Others contrast the effects of transfers vis-a-vis own tax collection efforts 
on the allocation of government expenditures, providing empirical evidence that transfers are 
more prone to be spent on goods not as valued by voters and that an increase in taxes leads to 
public spending of higher quality (Mendes 2005; Gadenne 2011). More closely related to the 
topics covered in this chapter are several recent studies exploring the impact of the recent oil 
shock, and corresponding royalty flows to municipal governments, on a number of different 
outcomes, such as local levels of public good provision and measures of living standards (Caselli 
                                                                                                                                                       






and Michaels 2009), growth rates (Postali 2009); tax effort (Queiroz and Postali 2010); and 
levels of political competition and patronage (Ferraz and Monteiro 2010).  
From a methodological standpoint, the focus on Brazilian local governments provides a 
unique opportunity to study subnational variation in the outcomes of interest of this dissertation. 
With its more than 5000 municipalities observed over a time span of 10 years, such a research 
design allows one to expand the number of available observations while at the same time holding 
constant the institutional, cultural, and policy environment that usually confound cross-country 
comparisons (Snyder 2001). In addition, the case of Brazil is substantively interesting for two 
reasons: first, because the high levels of royalty payment decentralization provide an opportunity 
to observe how the effects of fiscal windfalls operate at the local level. Secondly, for a study in 
which one of the outcomes of interest is the political budget cycle, it is convenient for the 
researcher to have a system with a fixed, or exogenous, electoral calendar. The presidential 
nature of the Brazilian regime provides such a context. In sum, methodological as well as 
substantive reasons make the Brazilian municipalities serve as a new and interesting testing 
ground for the theoretical assumptions and hypotheses of this dissertation. 
To reiterate some of these main assumptions and hypotheses, recall from chapter 1 
(theory) that in the presence of fiscal windfalls, the theory assumes that voters are likely to face 
serious informational constraints about the true state of public finance (e.g. how much revenue 
the government has) and thus, they are also more uncertain about the extent of rent extraction by 
incumbents. The empirical correlate of this assumption is that levels of fiscal transparency are 
expected to be relatively low when non-tax revenue sources make up an important share of the 





measure for fiscal windfalls and exploiting variation in municipality’s willingness to declare 
public finance data to the federal government (a proxy for fiscal transparency). 
Given these informational constraints, I argue it is optimal for voters to demand higher 
levels of public goods from incumbents in the face of a positive economic shock as a way to 
limit the extent of rent extraction. From a supply side perspective, the fact that voters demand 
public goods induces politicians to engage in opportunistic manipulations of the budget around 
election times. In the presence of windfall revenue, such a motivation is coupled with an 
opportunity structure: incumbents tend to enjoy a large share of the political benefit of spending 
but pay only a small fraction of the political cost of taxation. Thus, we should expect these 
authorities to use such low-cost spending power to remain in office and elections represent an 
important political opportunity to do so. Thus, the political budget cycle emerges as another 
empirical implication of the theory and this chapter looks at its size by comparing municipalities 
entitled to receive royalties and less fortunate types. Finally, the theory expects that in the 
presence of windfall wealth, voters should reward (or at least not punish) incumbents who 
increase expenditures around elections. This chapter thus looks at whether fiscal expansions 
during election years are punished or rewarded by local voters at the polls. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 presents some basic styled facts on 
Brazilian local government’s revenue sources, spending responsibilities, as well as the rules 
regarding the distribution of oil wealth across different government tiers. After briefly describing 
the data sources to be used in the empirical analysis (Section 2), Section 3, the core of the paper, 
contains three different but related empirical exercises. In particular, the section analyzes the 
impact of royalty payments on municipalities: a) levels of fiscal transparency, b) size of political 





co-partisans). Each of these exercises tests at the subnational level the assumptions and 
hypotheses already tested in previous empirical chapters in a cross-national context.63 
Conclusions follow.    
 
5.1 Background 
Fiscal federalism, elections, and local public finance. Brazil is a federal and presidential 
republic, composed of 27 states (including the Federal District) and 5,564 municipalities. The 
states and municipalities together account for more than one-third of national tax revenue 
collection, and two-fifths of total government spending; that is, figures that represent levels of 
fiscal decentralization not only comparable to OECD federations (Afonso and Mello 2000), but 
that also make Brazil one of the most decentralized developing countries in the world (Bardhan 
and Mookherjee 2006; Shah 2006). Municipal or local governments undertake an important 
share of total spending in Brazil (6.5% of GDP), yet they collect only a small fraction of total 
taxes (2% of GDP). Local level spending accounts for 15% of consolidated public sector 
expenditures, and municipalities have played an increasingly important role in the provision of 
social services such as (preventive) health care and (primary) education, which together make up 
almost half of municipality’s total outlays. Mayors are also in charge of providing basic public 
services to the municipality, particularly in the area of public transportation, which is a policy 
issue under the exclusive jurisdiction of local governments (Afonso and Araujo 2006). 
In terms of revenue mobilization, while the Constitution allows substantial room for 
municipalities to collect their own taxes, there is divergence between municipalities' de jure tax 
                                                
63 I do not explore the procyclicality hypothesis here since public expenditure smoothing is seldom carried out by 
subnational governments, a stylized fact for both developed and developing federations (Struzzenger and Werneck 






capacity and their de facto levels of tax collection (Gadenne 2011). For example, in 2009, local 
governments collected from their two main local taxes64 levels that ranged from 1 to 2100 R$ per 
capita. Between 2000 and 2009, local governments financed on average only 6% of municipal 
budgets with their own tax revenues (receitas tributarias), although there is great variation 
around this figure: in the relatively poor municipalities of states like Maranhão, local taxes make 
up less than 1% of total revenues, while in the richer municipalities of Sao Paulo, local tax 
collection accounts for more than 60% of total revenues.  
To address such large vertical fiscal asymmetries, the bulk of municipal spending is 
supported by a complex system of revenue sharing and intergovernmental fiscal grants, 
enshrined in the constitution of 1988 whereby both the Union (and state governments) 
redistribute fiscal resources toward the lower tiers under different revenue schemes and funds.65 
As shown in Figure 5.1, municipalities are the main beneficiaries of such a system, as their share 
of disposable revenue (that is, revenue available after intergovernmental transfers have taken 
place) is three times as large as their contribution to the total tax burden.  
                                                
64 A tax on services (ISS), and the urban property tax (IPTU). 
 














Source: Afonso and Castro (2011) 
 
The most important federal equalization transfer scheme for the municipalities is the Fundo de 
Participacao dos Municipios (FPM) a constitutionally mandated transfer that redistributes 
resources according to population criteria, which in 2009 represented 42% of local government’s 
revenues on average and that is responsible for achieving relatively high levels of inter-regional 
redistribution (Arretche 2010).66 In sum, municipal politicians enjoy a large share of the political 
benefit of spending, yet pay only a small fraction of the political cost of taxation. How are they 
elected? As in other presidential systems, the electoral calendar in Brazil is fixed. Local elections 
(for mayor and municipal council) are held every four years on a different cycle than presidential 
and gubernatorial elections.67 Thanks to a constitutional reform in 1997 softening term limits at 
all levels of government, mayors are allowed to be reelected once, with the possibility of 
                                                
66 Transfers received under the revenue-sharing of the tax on Service and Goods circulation (ICMS) are transfers 
originated from tax collected by the states and represent the second largest source of transfers for municipalities. 
 

























returning after a one-term hiatus. Thus, the 2000 elections marked the introduction of a second 
consecutive term possibility for local incumbents. 
 
The oil boom, Brazilian style. Against this background of large fiscal imbalances, one should 
add the fact that some municipalities were benefited with additional revenue stemming from 
natural resource rents since the early 2000s, a result of increased oil production and new 
legislation governing the exploitation, regulation of the oil industry, and distribution of oil 
revenue between different government levels (Law 9478/97).68 Oil rents in Brazil are extracted 
through two main tax instruments: The so-called Royalties – a 10% ad valorem tax over the 
gross revenue of oil production – and the Special Participation tax – a tax levying on the income 
of highly productive projects.69 While in 1998 these two sources of revenue accounted for only 
0,03% of GDP, this figure ascended to almost 1% in 2008 (Afonso and Castro 2010).70  
High levels of vertical decentralization characterize the distribution of oil revenue in 
Brazil: around 60 to 65% of total royalty payments are transferred to the states and 
municipalities through a combination of different rules applying to on-shore and off-shore 
production (Afonso and Castro 2008). Rules regarding the distribution of rents from off-shore 
production make the municipalities the largest single recipients of rent revenue, and since the 
recent increase in oil production has been largely an off-shore phenomenon (95% of total 
production), municipalities have been one of the key beneficiaries of the system during the last 
                                                
68 Production growth has been accompanied by increases in proven reserves, which are likely to increse even more 
in the medium run with full exploitation of the “pre-sal” (below the salt) oilfieds that lie below 2km of water, and 3 
km of salt in the Santos Basin. 
 
69 For simplicity will refer to both concepts as royalty payments from now on. 
 
70 This upward trajectory is the result of a combination of factors. In addition to the market incentives provided by 
the new regulatory framework, the volume of royalty payments increased for two more reasons: the rise in oil prices 





boom (Ferraz and Monteiro 2010; Gobetti 2011). Figure 5.2 shows the recent increase in royalty 
payments as a result of the oil boom. 










Two main rules define whether a municipality is entitled to receive royalties: (1) the 
municipality must be considered a ‘producer locality’, and (2) the municipality must be directly 
or indirectly impacted by oil and gas production. 71  In the case of off-shore production, 
eligibility as producer is driven by a geographic criterion:  a municipality is considered a 
“bordering” (confrontante) municipality if it happens to confront an oil well located kilometers 
away in the ocean, according to orthogonal and parallel projections to the Brazilian coast 
extracted from nautical letters as shown in Figure A5.1 (Appendix). Thus, depending on the 
shape of its coast, the municipality includes more or less wells under its area, receiving royalty 
payments accordingly. Regarding the second rule, all activities of embarkation and 
                                                
71 See Afonso and Gobetti (2008) and Afonso and Castro (2010) for excellent overviews of the governance structure 





disembarkation (including transportation by pipelines) are included in the criteria of eligibility 
(Postali 2009). 
 As a result of these criteria, royalty payments are largely concentrated in some coastal 
states and municipalities in Brazil (see Figure A5.2, Appendix). Figure 5.3 shows the distribution 
of royalty payments between the main nine producing states in Brazil (plus Amazonas) in 2008. 
The state of Rio de Janeiro alone concentrates 83% of total royalty payments at the state level, 
since the major oil basins – Campos Basin and Santos Basin – are located in front of this state’s 
coast, making it the major oil producer in the country.  
 










Figure 5.4 turns to the distribution of royalty payments across municipalities: it plots each 
municipality, ranked in terms of the size of royalty payments per capita received in 2010. As 
with the states, a similar picture of highly unequal distribution among municipalities is apparent 














































Only twenty (out of more than 5000) municipalities account for more than half of total per capita 
royalty payments, and the top ranked 100 municipalities for more than 80%. These municipalities 
tend to be the relatively richer municipalities belonging to South East Brazil, the most developed 
region of the federation (Serra 2007). As shown in Figure 5.5, there is a clear positive 
relationship between levels of local GDP and royalty payments per capita, a fact that tends to 
accentuate already high levels of regional disparities and to off-set the relatively progressive 
characteristics of some federal intergovernmental transfers schemes such as FPM (Afonso and 

















Based on normative grounds like inter-regional and generational justice principles, the 
current criteria linking geography to oil rents has stirred important criticisms from the 
specialized literature (Serra 2007, Gobetti et al. 2010), and of course, the creation of a non-
producer states coalition in Congress with reform proposals that attempt to “universalize” the 
distribution of royalties.72 From an academic point of view, however, the fact that an important 
share of total royalty distribution follows a geographic criterion provides the researcher with an 
important source of exogeneity to study the effects of fiscal windfalls on local public finance, an 
exercise we turn into in Section 5.3, after describing some basic features of the data (see below).  
 
                                                
72 For example, a bill introducing a change to the current scheme in favor of allocating royalty payments to all 
municipalities according to FPM criteria passed through Congress but was vetoed by outgoing president Lula in 
2010. A similar bill has been approved by the Senate in late 2011, but a decision by the Lower House on whether to 
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To study the effects of fiscal windfalls on local public finance, three key data sources were 
employed. First, annual variation in royalty payments received by all levels of government 
including municipalities between 1999 and 2010 is provided by Info-Royalties website 
(http://inforoyalties.ucam-campos.br), created by a local research center (UCAM, Universidade 
Candido Mendes).73 Second, electoral results from 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 local elections, 
as well as party identification of incumbent mayors and challengers are available from Tribunal 
Superior Eleitoral (TSE). Finally, data on public finance, including detailed information on 
levels and sources (own tax, transfers, type of transfers, etc.) of local government revenues as 
well as size and composition of government expenditures are available from the National 
Treasury from 2000 to 2009, trough the Finanzas do Brasil (FINBRA) database.74  It is important 
to note that these data are self-declared by municipalities, that local government are obliged to 
report this information to the federal government, but not all of them do so every year. Following 
the lead of Ferraz and Monteiro (2010), this fact will be exploited in the next section when 
looking at the determinants of fiscal transparency across municipalities.    
 
5.3 Evidence 
This section contains three different empirical exercises: I first test the hypothesis that fiscal 
windfalls, in the form of royalty payments, are associated with lower transparency in the budget 
process, as measured by the probability of a municipality disclosing its public accounts to the 
federal government in a given year. Secondly, I study whether royalty revenue conditions the 
                                                
73 Programa de Mestrado em Planejamento Regional e Gestão de Cidades, da Universidade Candido Mendes - 
Campos dos Goytacazes (RJ). 
 
74 All fiscal variables in the FINBRA database were expressed in real per capita terms, in Brazilian currency units 





impact of elections on the level and composition of government expenditures by looking at the 
issue of “political budget cycles”. Finally, I turn to the electoral returns of public spending 
increases in a subsample of municipalities. 
 
5.3.1 Do royalty payments reduce fiscal transparency? 
Given that municipalities self-report public finance data to the National Treasury, and that 
royalty payment data is collected independently from this source, our first exercise tests whether 
being a royalty recipient impacts the probability of under-reporting budgets, or in other words, if 
oil wealth is associated with lower levels of fiscal transparency. Thus, the dependent variable in 
this first empirical exercise is a dummy indicating whether municipality j in time t declares its 
yearly-executed budget (equal to 1), and 0 if data for that particular municipality/year is missing.  
The main independent variable is also a dummy that equals 1 if the municipality received 
royalty payments, and 0 otherwise (ROYALTY). Additional controls include size of local 
population (in logs), levels of local economic development (also in logs) and a measure of 
electoral competition: the margin of victory, that is, the difference in vote shares between the 
winner and runner-up in first round elections in municipality j during elections under the period 
of analysis.75 The logic of inclusion of most of these economic and political controls was 
discussed in the previous chapter on the determinants of transparency at the cross-national level 
and we should expect similar dynamics to operate at the local level. However, here I introduce a 
new variable: the size of local population, to account for the possibility that it may be easier for 
voters to infer how much revenue the government has when each individual represents a larger 
percentage of the overall tax base. 
                                                
75 Since the period (2000-2009) covers three elections (2000, 2004, 2008), levels of political competition are 
assigned to each year in the following way: 2000 levels for years 2000-2003, 2004 levels for years 2004-2007, and 





Table 5.1 presents results from a logistic regression in a panel of yearly data (2000-2009), 
pooling all municipalities (n=5563) together. Municipal fixed effects are included in all 
specifications, so the estimates only reflect within-municipality variation. 
 
Table	  5.1:	  Determinants	  of	  fiscal	  transparency	  in	  Brazilian	  municipalities	  
 
Levels of fiscal transparency are systematically lower in years when municipalities received 
royalty payments. Depending on the model of choice in Columns 1-5, the probability of 
disclosing fiscal information is 6-18 percentage points lower in municipalities benefited from the 
windfall sometime during the period under analysis.76 To capture such trends graphically, Figure 
5.6 plots the total number of missing fiscal data observations (in bars) and the contribution of 
royalty recipients to that total (dashed-line) by year. While in 2000 royalty recipients accounted 
for less than half of total fiscal missing data, in 2008, the peak of the oil boom, 95% of cases can 
                                                
76 A recent study confirms this finding using a different data source on royalty payments (De Oliveira 2011). 
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be attributed to municipalities benefited by oil wealth that year. Clearly, the distribution of 
missing fiscal data is not random at the local level in Brazil. 
 












It is worth discussing results from the rest of the control variables. For example, in some 
specifications, the level of economic development sometimes has the wrong (negative) sign but 
this result is not robust across all specifications. Similar considerations affect the size of 
municipality variable. Finally, levels of electoral competition, as measured by the vote margin of 
victory do not seem to affect fiscal transparency once we condition on access to royalty 
payments.     
Additionally, Columns 5-7 in Table 5.1 restrict the analysis to the municipalities of the 
state of Rio de Janeiro, the largest oil producer in the country, from 2003 (the start of the oil 
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independent variable is the amount of royalty payments per capita received (in logs) in a 
particular year (ROYALTY PAYMENTS), in order to compare differences in levels of , such as 
the Campos vs. Sao Francisco mentioned in the introduction. As with the full sample, the sign of 
the fiscal windfall coefficient is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels in the 
Rio de Janeiro sample. In sum, exploiting the fact that municipality’s self-declare fiscal accounts 
and that not all municipalities report them every year, I find that fiscal transparency tends to be 
significantly lower in oil rich local governments, a finding that is consistent with the cross-
country regressions results from previous chapter, and with the theoretical assumption linking 
non-tax revenue sources to (fiscal) opacity. 
 
5.3.2 Royalty payments and political budget cycles 
As noted in the introduction, federal fiscal arrangements create a soft budget constraint at 
the municipal level in Brazil: local incumbents tend to enjoy a large share of the political benefit 
of spending but pay only a small fraction of the political cost of taxation. Most of the resources 
they spend on public goods originate from intergovernmental transfers and/or with some luck, 
royalty payments. Interstingly, oil windfalls enter the local budget constraint as a purely additive 
component: they have no offsetting effect on a municipality's other transfers from the state or 
federal governments. So we should expect these authorities to use such low-cost spending power 
to remain in office. Electoral years are thus key events where one should observe such behavior 
played out.  
Indeed, the empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that expenditure increases are 
driven by the electoral cycle in the Brazilian local context (Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2010). 





units. This section fills this gap by testing the hypothesis that royalty payments exacerbate 
political budget cycles (PBC). In other words, I test the proposition that the size of the political 
budget cycle is larger among royalty recipient municipalities, or that, the higher the level of 
dependence on royalty revenue, the stronger the marginal impact of election years on public 
expenditure increases.  
 
Empirical strategy. To test this interactive hypothesis, and based on a sample of more than 5000 
municipalities between 2000 and 2009, I estimate a dynamic panel model of the type:
 
 
where Expend: total real public expenditures per capita; ELECT is a dummy variable equal to 1 
in election years and 0 otherwise77; and ROYALTY refers to the ratio of royalty payments to 
total municipal revenue. Additional controls include: a) Municipal Gdp per capita (in logs), b) 
Population (in logs), and c) Transfers: Total constitutional transfers relative to municipal 
revenue (in logs), a lagged dependent variable, and , a municipal fixed effect.78 Logging the 
variables is appropriate given the strong skew in the ROYALTY payments and expenditures 
variables, so the coefficients from the models can thus be interpreted in terms of percentages. 
The inclusion of the transfers’ variable tries to control for the level of fiscal autonomy of the 
municipality: higher autonomy (e.g. lower dependence on transfers) may provide the mayor with 
a bigger ability to manage resources to promote opportunistic spending. Alternatively, one could 
                                                
77 During the sample period, local electoral years include 2000, 2004, and 2008. 
 





argue that transfers may operate as another type of alternative revenue source, providing a 
motivation and means to engage in political budget cycles.79  
 
Results. Table 5.2 reports the coefficients and robust standard errors (clustered by municipality) 
from estimating equation 1 using OLS fixed effects and GMM-Arellano and Bond (1991) 
estimators. The latter estimation procedure is needed since in the presence of fixed effects, the 
equation above is estimated in differences. While first differencing gets rid of the municipality 
specific effects, it leads by construction to a correlation between the differenced lagged fiscal 
variable and the differenced error term. Thus, the one-step GMM estimation procedure suggested 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) is called for, which consists in using lagged levels of the 
explanatory variables (including the lagged dependent variable) as instruments. 
 
                                                
79 An electoral competition variable (the margin of victory) is not included in these models since they were found 






















According to the coefficients in Model 1, real per capita public expenditures increase by 
6% in electoral years on average, but this effect varies as a function of the level of dependence 
on royalty payments. For a municipality in which royalty payments account for 20% of total 
revenues, public spending increases by 8% in electoral years. However, when this level of 
dependence reaches 80% of the budget, the boost in public spending during electoral years is 
14%, that is, an effect more than two times the size of the coefficient for municipalities that do 




























spending increases for each unit increase in the level of rent dependence. The conditional 
relationship between elections and royalty payments is robust to the method of estimation: the 
GMM estimates suggest effects of a similar order of magnitude to the fixed effects model. These 
results are consistent with our theoretical expectation that from a supply side perspective, 
incumbent local politicians should use their low cost spending power (oil rents) to remain in 
power and attract voters via public spending. 
 














In addition to affecting overall levels of public spending, do incumbents manipulate the 
composition of the budget as well during electoral years?80 To answer this question, I introduce 
                                                



























two new fiscal instruments as dependent variables: the log of current expenditures81 per capita, 
and the log of investment expenditures (e.g. infrastructure and machinery) per capita; and split 
the sample into royalty recipients and non-royalty recipients. The current vs. capital expenditure 
divide is a common way of classifying budget items in official public accounts, and in the 
context of the budget cycle literature, an important question is whether incumbents try to shift 
the budget toward expenditures that are most valued by voters (Drazen and Eslava 2010). 
Table 5.3 presents results from the standard GMM Arellano and Bond dynamic panel 
approach with two lags of each endogenous variable.  In addition, I introduce total spending per 
capita as a control so that the coefficient on the electoral variable can be interpreted as the 
election year effect on the share of spending in each budget category. The results show a 
systematic change in the composition of the budget in electoral years, especially among royalty 
recipient municipalities. 
                                                























In local governments that are royalty recipients, the budget share of current expenditures 
increases by 20% during electoral years, while no effect of this sort is evident across the rest of 
municipalities. On the investment side of the budget, both types of municipalities tend to 
significantly decrease this type of expenditure during elections: in the case of royalty recipients, 
they do so in an order of magnitude similar to the current expenditure increase. Interestingly, a 
similar effect is obtained when looking at the behavior of the Transfers variable, suggesting that 
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there may be common uses of both types of revenues given their similar collection technologies 
(in both cases the mayor does not pay the political cost of collection).  
The findings on increased public employment spending and corresponding reductions in 
investment expenditures as shares of total budgets during election years should be placed against 
the fact that municipalities are in principle forbidden to use royalty income to hire employees on 
a permanent basis, and that infrastructure takes time to provide public/private benefits and visible 
outcomes. This picture is consistent with theoretical accounts that link resource abundance to (a) 
increasing motivation for incumbents to create government jobs and rely on patronage to stay in 
power (Robinson et al. 2006) and, (b) a reduction in their time horizons and thus, fewer 
investments in long-run public projects (Caselli 2007).  
 
5.3.3. Electoral returns of local public spending 
 The evidence thus far shows that the positive impact of elections on levels of public 
expenditures is larger among municipalities that are royalty recipients. In other words, the size of 
the political budget cycle increases in the presence of windfall revenue. The natural follow up 
question is whether such opportunistic spending increases lead to better electoral outcomes for 
the incumbent (or her copartisan).82 Thus, the goal of our final empirical exercise is to estimate 
the electoral effects of local public spending cycles by studying the impact of election year 
expenditures on the vote share and probability of reelection of incumbent mayors or a successor 
of the same political party. 
                                                
82 For recent contributions on the subject exploiting subnational variation, see Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008), 






 To do so, I restrict the analysis to the subset of coastal municipalities located within the 
nine producing states of Brazil.83 As explained in the introduction, the recent oil boom in Brazil 
has been largely an off-shore phenomenon. Since the rules for allocating royalty payments from 
off-shore production are based on geographic criteria, windfall revenue is concentrated on some 
municipalities across the Brazilian coast (see Figure A5.2 Appendix). As argued in Ferraz and 
Monteiro (2010), such rules make explicit the fact that conditional on being on the coast, the 
status of being a royalty recipient is quite random, providing a sample of municipalities that are 
mostly similar on a number of important covariates and thus suitable for this type of comparison 
(see Ferraz and Monteiro 2010, Table 4). 
 
Empirical strategy. Using information from the 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 municipal elections, 
the basic equation(s) to be estimated is the following: 
 
€ 
Yit = αi + β1 log  EXPENDit + β2 POLITICAL CONTROLSit + β3 ECONOMIC CONTROLSit + εit  
 
where Yit is (1) the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent mayor or his/her political 
party of the local election t in municipality i; and (2) equal to 1 when the mayor or his/her party 
is reelected and 0 otherwise. 
Among the political controls, I code political parties on the ideological spectrum as left, 
center, or right wing following the classification in Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008; 2010). In 
addition, I introduce a dummy variable that assumes value 1 if the mayor’s party belongs to the 
president’s coalition (0 otherwise). In particular, two different governing coalitions are 
                                                
83 Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahia, Espirito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Parana. The 
definition of coastal municipality is given by the Brazilian National Statistical Institute (IBGE) and data on coastal 





considered: the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) from 1995 to 2002, and the 
presidency of Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva (Lula) from 2003-2010. Economic controls include 
levels of municipal GDP per capita (in log) and total population (in log) in each municipality. 
The key coefficient of interest is βi capturing the effect of election year real expenditures per 
capita on electoral success. Finally, αi is a municipality specific effect that depending on the 
model at hand, is assumed either fixed or randomly distributed. 
 
Results. Table 5.4 presents the basic results: since the dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is 
the vote share of incumbent mayor or party, models are estimated by OLS. In Columns 3 and 4, 
the dependent variable is the reelection dummy, so the equation is estimated using Logistic 
regression. Given that a Hausman test comparing the fixed vs. random effects failed to reject the 
null-hypothesis that RE provides consistent estimates, I concentrate most of the discussion on the 
latter type of models.84 
                                                
84 For Columns 1 and 2, a test of RE against FE yields an overall  statistic with p-value=0.30. The corresponding 









Results from Model 2 show that holding economic and political controls constant, a 1% 
increase in real per capita government expenditures boosts the vote share of the incumbent 
mayor or her party by 9%. Given that the average margin of victory for the full sample of 
municipalities in the four elections between 1996 and 2008 was 16%, the size of this coefficient 
is far from being negligible.85 Model 4 (Column 4.1) presents estimation results for the 
                                                
85 Margin of victory denotes the difference in vote shares between the winner and the runner-up in first round 
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probability of electoral victory. As with the vote share, results show a significant positive impact 
of EXPENDITURE on the probability of reelection. To interpret the substantive meaning of this 
result, Column 4.2 shows the coefficients of Model 4 in terms of marginal effects: additional 
government expenditures by the incumbent mayor or party increase the probability of retaining 
the municipality by 19 percentage points.  Finally, Figure 5.8 shows how the probability of 
victory varies (e.g. increases) across the range of the EXPENDITURE variable, while holding all 
other co-variates at their mean or modal values for categorical variables. 











Taking advantage of a dramatic increase in royalty payments transferred to some Brazilian 
municipalities during the 2000s, and using disaggregated local finance data, this chapter looks at 
the impact of revenue windfalls on levels of fiscal transparency, size of political budget cycles, 
and the electoral effects of public spending. Several findings of interest are obtained, including: 





probability of not declaring public finance data is reduced by up to 18 percentage points when a 
municipality receives royalty payments in a given year. 
(2a) The size of the political budget cycle is more than twice as large in municipalities that are 
highly dependent on windfall revenue (“petro-rentistas”). In light of finding # 1, the observed 
budget cycle effect could be interpreted as a lower bound on the real impact of elections on 
public expenditures in the presence of oil wealth. 
(2b) An opportunistic shift in the composition of government expenditures occurs in oil 
benefited municipalities: while the share of long term investment projects in total spending goes 
down, current (payroll) expenditures increase as share of the total budget during electoral years. 
(3) Finally, voters reward incumbent politicians who increase public spending in electoral years: 
their probability of reelection goes up by about 20 percentage points for additional government 
expenditures. 
These findings complement the cross-national empirical exercises of the last two 
chapters. Putting the cross national and subnational findings together, the results provide 
evidence that the mechanisms specified by the theory tend to play out in similar terms across 
different government level units. First, fiscal transparency tends to be lower in places (e.g. 
municipalities, countries) that are benefited by non-tax revenue sources, and the size of political 
budget cycles tends to be larger when incumbents (e.g. mayors, presidents) can count on such 
low cost spending to remain in power. 
Additionally, these findings speak directly to on-going debates about the new governance 
structure for the sharing of royalty payments across Brazil. The political and legislative debate 
has focused so far on the distributive aspects of the new legislation: that is, whether royalties 





only “producing” states and municipalities take a bite. Adherents of the status quo have few 
pieces of evidence to support their argument. In fact, previous studies at the level of Brazilian 
local governments have shown that fiscal windfalls are associated with low tax effort (Postali 
and Queiroz 2010), bloated public sectors (Ferraz and Monteiro 2010), and relatively few 
improvements in living standards (Caselli and Michales 2009). This chapter adds to the number 
of perverse outcomes generated by windfall wealth that of low levels of fiscal transparency, and 
opportunistic budget manipulations around election times. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that regardless of whether royalty payments are universalized or remain targeted, a governance 
structure based on an audit system that reports how fiscal windfalls are being spent by incumbent 
politicians should be in place. Back in the early 2000s, the federal government launched an 
anticorruption program based on the random auditing of local governments expenditures that are 
financed by federal fiscal transfers and funds with relative success. An extension of such 
program that includes the auditing of fiscal windfalls seems warranted in light of the facts 
presented in this paper and other pieces of evidence from the specialized literature.   
Finally, this paper highlights the need for advancing the research agenda on at least two 
fronts. First, in light of the transparency findings, work on how information can enhance voter 
awareness about the total size and use of windfall revenue becomes particularly salient. Indeed, 
surveys conducted during 2003 and 2004 in Campos dos Goytacazes, the municipality 
mentioned in the introduction as being one the largest royalty recipients, suggests that voter 
awareness about the availability and nature of royalty payments was relatively low. While a 
majority of voters could tell that Campos was a resource rich municipality, very few knew about 





fiscal windfall available to the local government.86 In this context of large information 
asymmetries, opportunities for rent-seeking (corrupt) behavior on behalf of incumbents tend to 
expand. It is thus no surprise to find that events such corruption scandals, with incumbents being 
accused and ousted from office for misuse of public funds are recurrent feature of the political 
scenario among top-benefited local governments (Caselli and Michael 2009; Ferraz and 
Monteiro 2010). In addition, recent evidence based on natural (Ferraz and Finan 2008) and field 
(Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2010) experiments suggests that the impact of disclosing 
information on electoral behavior, voting attitudes, and electoral outcomes are significant both at 
the municipality and individual level, respectively.87 Thus, future work could explore the effects 
on electoral behavior of offering more information to voters about windfall revenue and its use 
by incumbent politicians. Does providing additional information about how governments spend 
resources affect voter choices, by for example, leading to the punishment of corrupt mayors at 
the polls? These are questions where further research is definitely needed. 
Finally, by exploiting local level variation in access to windfall wealth, one can study the 
efficient use of public expenditures in oil benefited and non-benefited municipalities. While 
previous research suggests that public expenditure levels of all types increase in the former, we 
still lack an assessment of how such input levels relate to outputs. At the same time, with the 
release of information on audit reports on corruption, one may be able to analyze the 
incumbent’s allocation decision between corruption and public good provision more cleanly.  
                                                
86 See Boletim Petróleo, Royalties e Região, June 2004, Available at http://www.royaltiesdopetroleo.ucam-
campos.br/index.php?cod=1 
 
87 See also Chong et al. (2011) for a field experiment along these lines in Mexico exploring the effects of an 































In this dissertation, I set out to explain variation across countries and over time in the behavior of 
fiscal policy over the business and electoral cycle. Two stylized facts motivate the analysis: 
fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical and the size of political budget cycles larger 
than in developed democracies.  Previous scholarship has studied the determinants of these 
phenomena in isolation.  
Thus, a first contribution of this dissertation is to present a unified theory of fiscal policy 
behavior that embeds these two findings within a common principal-agent framework of public 
finance. In this framework, policy is not chosen by benevolent social planners, as in normative 
analysis of welfare economics, but by rent-seeking politicians, who make tradeoffs between the 
amount of resources diverted to private uses and the provision of public goods that enhance their 
chances of reelection, and the voters that condition their electoral support on incumbent’s policy 
performance. 
Voters play a fundamental role in the theory. Unlike most of the existing literature, where 
interest group competition over public resources occupies the core of the theoretical attention, 
my argument concentrates on the incentives of voters to demand public spending under different 
informational regimes. The argument is however, not based on a preference-based explanation of 
fiscal policy, in which voters in developing countries, because of their relative poverty, simply 
demand more public spending than voters in the developed democracies, as a standard median 
voter framework would predict. Instead, the theory builds on the notion of informational 
asymmetries regarding public accounts between politicians and voters, and between voters across 





In particular, the flow of information that voters receive about public budgets is not 
exogenous but derived from particular revenue foundations. The main assumption of the theory 
is that governments that rely on fiscal windfalls (such as oil royalties or foreign aid) are less 
transparent than democracies that fund most of their spending with general taxation. Two reasons 
underlie this assumption: the revenue collection technology, and the incentives of incumbents to 
reveal information in different economic scenarios.  
First, fiscal windfalls accrue directly to government coffers, without any need of private 
collection from citizens, which make it hard for voters to infer how much total revenue the 
government counts with. Secondly, incumbents in windfall environments have incentives not to 
produce the most transparent budget procedures, since the asymmetry of information can be used 
for their advantage, by for example providing a minimum level of public goods that would 
satisfy rational but uninformed voters, while at the same allocating the rest of the windfall on 
private rents. This incentive to be opaque in the fiscal process is especially prevalent when 
economic conditions are good, and thus, room for rent seeking is widespread. 
In the context of such an opaque informational regime, the theory posits that voters’ 
rational response to the incumbent’s strategy is to raise their reservation utility in the form of 
higher public spending demands. Such demand, while procyclical, is the best the voter can do in 
order to try to tie the hands of rent seeking incumbents during good times, and the politician 
interested in reelection will have to satisfy this new reelection constraint if she wants to remain 
in power. As a result of this interaction, we should observe more procyclical fiscal policy and a 
political budget cycle when fiscal windfalls represent an important share of total fiscal revenue.  
The above theoretical framework can be used to interpret two of the main findings of this 





the share of fiscal revenue from mineral and oil sources) tend to show procyclical fiscal policy 
(chapter 2); 2) democracies that rely on non-tax revenue sources (as measured by the share of 
total revenue from oil, foreign aid grants, and other non-tax instruments) tend to engage in 
political budget cycles; while non-rentier democracies behave differently (chapter 3). Thus, a 
second contribution of this dissertation is the proposal of a new set of explanatory variables (tied 
to a country’s structure of public finance) to account for variation in well-studied policy issues, 
such as procyclicality and the opportunistic manipulation of the budget around election times. 
Previous contributions have generally ignored the role of the structure of public finance when 
explaining such important policy phenomena.  
In addition to the previous findings, two empirical chapters have provided initial support 
for the main working assumption of the theory: that voters should be less informed about public 
budget when windfalls represent an important component of public accounts.  Consistent with 
this notion, the existence of a negative relationship between windfalls and transparency is present 
in the data both across countries (chapter 4), and across subnational units within a country over 
time (chapter 5). In studying the determinants o voter’s access to public information on budget 
procedures, this dissertation joins the handful of studies that take the endogeneity of fiscal 
transparency seriously.  
Finally, I have tried to add to an emerging literature on the informational implications of 
different types of fiscal revenue on governance outcomes (Caselli and Michales 2009; Gadenne 
2011; Paler 2011). Most previous contributions have looked at these issues in single country 
settings with novel identification strategies. This dissertation has offered a first attempt at 





contributions of the project, I end the discussion with some policy lessons learned and outline 
next steps in terms of a research agenda.  
 
Policy implications 
The main message of this dissertation is that how governments are financed, and in particular, 
how much taxes they collect, matters a lot for understanding the behavior of public spending 
across the business and electoral cycle in developing countries. It thus identifies the conditions 
that emerge as favorable for fiscal policy to perform its stabilization function effectively. 
However, the international community has in general tended to address the procyclical bias with 
fiscal policy rules, in the hope that the passing of a fiscal responsibility law (FRL) or a cyclically 
adjusted balance (CAB) would make policy more predictable and credible (Balassone and 
Kumar 2007b).  
A first implication of this study is that such rules are no substitute for political consensus 
around prudent fiscal policy. In particular, I have argued that in the absence of a political 
constituency in favor of fiscal prudence, policy will be procyclical, regardless of whether a 
formal fiscal rule reducing political discretion is in place or not. Indeed, while there is ample 
empirical evidence suggesting a correlation between budget rules and good fiscal performance88, 
it is difficult to establish causality, since across the countries that tend to adopt them, the 
turnaround in policy behavior often occurs before their implementation (Corbacho and Schwartz 
2007). In addition, empirical exercises on the determinants of procyclicality show that measures 
of fiscal rules become insignificant once deeper politico-institutional variables are included in 
the analysis (Manasse 2006). 
A second implication of this research is that developing countries, in the absence of tax 
                                                





revenue mobilization efforts, should at least aim to increase transparency in order to improve 
fiscal outcomes. By exploring the informational implications of different types of revenue 
sources, this research tries to go beyond traditional resource curse arguments in specifying 
similarities between different types of fiscal windfalls that do not necessarily derive from natural 
resource wealth. Because of their collection technology, oil royalties, foreign aid, and 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers share a common trait: they are all susceptible to (lack of) 
transparency problems. From this perspective, this research speaks not only to debates about how 
to manage fiscal policy over the business cycle, but also concerns about the mechanics of foreign 
aid allocation and its integration with national budgets, as well as trends toward (fiscal) 
decentralization in the developing world. 
 
Research agenda 
The theory developed in chapter 1 posits that under a certain structure of public finance 
and thus, a corresponding informational regime, voters are more or less likely to make 
procyclical demands. In the abscence of cross-country survey data on citizen’s public 
consumption smoothing preferences89, I have tested the argument in a reduced form by using 
available cross-national and subnational data. However, to help put the argument on firmer 
footing, it is important to move towards a micro-level analysis that would ideally complement 
the cross-national and subnational findings presented here. One potential avenue of future 
research is thus the design of surveys or field experiments that would allow to answer questions 
such as the following: does providing information about government’s budgets affect voter’s 
                                                
89 For U.S data, see Shiller (1997) who reports that among the 80% of Americans who agree with the statement that 
preventing recessions is an important policy prerrogative, 83% endorse the importance of counter-cyclical policy 
even if ‘the method of preventing economic recessions had an absolutely equal impact on economic booms by 
preventing really good times just as much as it prevented really bad times. For evidence on voter aversion to 





demands for public goods over the economic cycle? Similarly, in the context of an informational 
campaign across local governments with acces to windfall rents, one could asses whether 
electoral behavior changes when voters are provided with information about the levels and use of 
windfall revenue by incumbent politicians.  
Moving beyond microfoundations, another potential avenue of research is to exploit the 
theoretical differences between windfall and tax revenue developed here to study other outcomes 
of interest, both at the national and subnational levels. In particular, recall that from the 
principal-agent framework, a politician, given a certain budget constraint, makes allocation 
decisions between the provision of public goods and the diversion of funds for personal gains 
(rents). Thus, future research should attempt at measuring these two components and asses the 
extent to which taxes and windfalls affect the overall quality of public spending. While cross-
nationally the measurement problem is acute, at the subnational level the undertaking seems 
more plausible. In the Brazilian context, for example, several studies have developed original 
measures of the extent of corruption by taking advantage of publicly available audit reports on 
expenditure behavior at the local level (Litschig and Zamboni 2008; Ferraz and Finan 2008; 
2011; Brollo et al. 2010). The corruption data, together with the development of measures of 
public expenditure efficiency, provide an opportunity to extend this research to study whether the 
quality of public spending is affected by access to windfall revenue. 
 
Final remarks  
 Students of fiscal policy often tend to cluster in two separate groups: those that study tax 
revenues or tax administration on one side, and the ones that focus on public expenditures on the 





empirically the impact of how democratic governments finance themselves (taxes vs. windfalls) 
on expenditure behavior over the business and electoral cycle. The dissertation is inspired by a 
central question in comparative political economy: how do countries, through their political 
institutions, decide to adjust fiscal policies in response to economic shocks?	  More often that not,	  
scholars have tried to address this puzzle by recurring to factors outside the fiscal system, such as 
for example levels of institutional development. In contrast to this tendency, I have argued that 
the answer may not lie far behind the fiscal realm. Looking at the sources of government fiscal 
revenue can go some way in explaining how voters and politicians interact in deciding how to 
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